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Abstract 
 
The following dissertation contains two distinct empirical essays which contribute to the overall 
field of Financial Economics. Chapter 1 titles as “Corporate Lobbying, CEO Political Ideology 
and Firm Performance”. We investigate the influence of CEO political orientation on corporate 
lobbying efforts. Specifically, we study whether CEO political ideology, in terms of manager-level 
campaign donations, determines the choice and amount of firm lobbying involvement and the 
impact of lobbying on firm value. We find a generous engagement in lobbying efforts by firms 
with Republican leaning-managers, which lobby a larger number of bills and have higher lobbying 
expenditures. However, the cost of lobbying offsets the benefit for firms with Republican CEOs. 
We report higher agency costs of free cash flow, lower Tobin’s Q, and smaller increases in buy 
and hold abnormal returns following lobbying activities for firms with Republican managers, 
compared to Democratic and Apolitical rivals. Overall, our results suggest that the effects of 
lobbying on firm performance vary across firms with different managerial political orientations. 
Chapter 2 titled as “Corporate Lobbying and Labor Relations: Evidence from Employee” 
Litigations. We utilize employee litigations and other work-related complaints to examine if 
lobbying firms are favored in judicial process. We gather 27,794 employee lawsuits (after initial 
court hearing) between 2000 and 2014 and test the relationship between employee allegations and 
firms’ lobbying strategies. We find that employee litigations increase the number of labor-related 
bills in our sample. We document that the increase in employee lawsuits may drive firms into 
lobbying to change policy proposals. We also find robust evidence that the case outcome is 
different for lobbying firms compared to non-lobbying rivals, which may protect the shareholder 
wealth in the long run. Our results present that lobbying activities may make a significant 
difference in employee allegations. Our findings highlight the benefit of building political capital 
to obtain a biased outcome in favor of politically-connected firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate Lobbying, CEO Political Ideology, Corporate Governance, Agency 
Problem, Excess Returns 
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Chapter 1 
Corporate Lobbying, CEO Political Ideology and Firm Performance 
 
1. Introduction  
This paper investigates the cause and consequences of corporate political lobbying in the U.S. and 
examines whether manger political ideology affects corporate lobbying actions and their ultimate 
contribution to firm value. The concept of corporate lobbying and firm performance has been an 
ongoing debate in the finance literature. From a shareholder perspective, corporate political 
lobbying is a strategic action that, through potential legislative and regulatory actions, may shift 
market opportunities in favor of the firm and/or the operating industry, thus increasing firm value 
through increased cash flows, or reduced firm operational risk. However, the firm’s managers, 
namely CEOs, who have their own personal political ideologies, are charged with establishing firm 
lobbying policy. Thus, an agency problem arises in the context of the corporate lobbying decision. 
The personal political beliefs of the CEO, combined with the perceived influence derived from the 
close access to politicians that corporate lobbying provides, can provide personal benefits to CEOs 
that are independent of changes in the value of the firm. Thus, the extent to which the lobbying 
agency costs exist and under what conditions they exist are of key importance to shareholders.  
Firm engagement in political strategy is defined as an advantage whereby campaign donations 
and/or lobbying expenditures ultimately increase firm value through the building of political 
capital (Goldman et al., 2009; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Boubakri et al., 2012; Hill et al,. 2013; 
Faccio, 2006; Niessen and Ruenzi, 2009, Cooper et al., 2010; Blau et al., 2013; Kroszner and 
Stratmann, 1998; Stratmann, 1995; and Chen et al., 2015). The main motivation to engage in 
political strategy is to endorse political actions on behalf of the firm’s interests. Particularly, the 
firm’s goal is to persuade politicians who, in turn, may become willing to support political acts 
that benefit the lobbying firms. Thus, the primary focus of this study is lobbying, which is a channel 
for firms to use their financial resources to impact policy proposals. However, agency costs may 
impact whether such political strategies are ultimately effective. Accordingly, we ask whether or 
not a CEO’s personal political contributions affect those of their firms and the degree to which 
such an effect results in changes in firm value.  
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Manager political orientation affects both firm performance and firm-level decision making 
processes. For example, Republican managers apply financially conservative policies (Hutton et 
al. 2014), and Democrat managers are more socially responsible (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014). 
Therefore, we hypothesize that manager political ideology could also explain the entry decision to 
lobbying activities, as well as the amount of involvement in lobbying itself. 
One possible explanation of a relation between manager political ideology and corporate policy 
and lobbying decisions is that the manager’s political ideology is consistent with the goals of the 
firm, and managers are selected to fulfill those goals. Therefore, the manager’s personal political 
interests are aligned with those of the firm, managers conduct optimal lobbying actions, agency 
costs are low, and there is the potential for the firm to benefit from corporate lobbying. On the 
other hand, it may be the case that the existence of agency costs induces managers to enact 
lobbying policies that are sub-optimal. For example, the manager’s personal political convictions, 
whether aligned with those of the firm or not, may cause the manager to overinvest in lobbying 
activities at the expense of shareholders. As a result, lobbing expenditures and agency costs 
increase, causing firm value to decline. Agency costs under these circumstances would be highest 
for firms with weak governance. Finally, there are many CEOs and firms that contribute to 
candidates and issues of both political parties. In this case, managers may see investing in political 
capital across both parties as a hedge against future policy actions that may harm the firm. In this 
case, the ultimate effect of firm lobbying activities on firm value is unclear. 
The relative importance of CEO political orientation on firm lobbying decisions and firm agency 
costs has not been explicitly investigated at the firm level in previous studies. We fill this gap in 
the literature by empirically testing a) how CEO political orientations determine firm lobbying 
behaviors, and b) whether corporate lobbying efforts create a value enhancing opportunity for 
lobbying firms across firms with different managerial political ideologies. Our study represents an 
initial analysis of a new panel dataset of individual CEO-level political contributions and corporate 
lobbying. First, we analyze whether manager political orientation is a determinant of corporate 
lobbying activity. We then examine whether the lobbying outcomes across distinct CEO ideologies 
contribute to shareholder wealth maximization. 
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Our sample consists of 2,503 unique firms and 4,585 distinct CEOs from the Compustat Executive 
Compensation (ExecuComp) database between 2000 and 2012, and we find strong evidence that 
corporate lobbying outcomes vary in accordance with the political orientation of the managers. 
Initially, we find that firms with Republican-leaning CEOs are lobbying the greatest number of 
bills and issues, have relatively larger lobbying expenditures, and employ a higher number of 
lobbyists. Hutton et al. (2014) find that Republican managers make less risky corporate decisions, 
have less debt and leverage, hold less tangible assets, and make safer investments. Additionally, 
we document a generous engagement in lobbying efforts by Republican-leaning CEOs, who enact 
lobbying as an overall corporate strategy. 
We next investigate whether the benefits of corporate lobbying drives the lobbying efforts. We 
focus on the CEO and board characteristics of lobbyist firms. We determine if lobbying introduces 
principal-agent problems, where the upper-level managers’ decisions are not in the shareholders’ 
interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). We find that lobbying CEOs earn higher compensation, i.e. 
total compensation, salary, and cash, compared to non-lobbying firm peers. In addition, lobbying 
CEOs have higher ownership in their firms and are associated with weaker governance, i.e. busy 
boards (Skaife et al., 2013). In this situation, if lobbying fails to create firm value, then only the 
managers, not the shareholders, would actually benefit from corporate lobbying efforts.  
Finally, we estimate the relationship between firm performance and lobbying and show that firms 
with Republican-leaning CEOs experience relatively poorer firm performance in terms of 
decreases in Tobin’s Q, increases in agency conflicts, and the lowest increase in buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns, compared to firms with Democrat and Apolitical CEOs. On the other hand, the 
results reveal that lobbying has no effect on the Tobin’s Q and agency costs of firms with 
Democrat-leaning managers, and these firms yield positive abnormal returns. Our results imply 
that Democrat-leaning firms do experience some benefits from lobbying, while the increase in 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns seen by Republican-leaning lobbying firms comes at the cost of 
increased agency costs and reductions in Tobin’s Q.  
Our results are not surprising, given that firms with Republican-leaning managers are shown to 
have higher political expenditures and heavy involvement in lobbying efforts. The results signify 
that firm performance appears to be different across the lobbying firms with managers of differing 
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political orientations. We find that some managers lobby even though firm value is not maximized. 
This finding provides evidence of a potential agency conflict, whereby excessive lobbying activity 
decreases shareholder wealth (Skaife et al., 2013). While lobbying expenditures spent by firms is 
not subject to any limit for legislative proposals, our findings may imply an optimal amount of 
political lobbying, whereby the firm will receive lobbying benefits up to a point, after which 
additional lobbying expenditures make the lobbying ineffective in raising firm value. This could 
suggest a hypothetical optimal lobbying expenditure for firms, and expenditure above that point 
will be a potential agency cost, not a benefit, to the firm.  
The paper proceeds as follows. We provide a summary of existing literature on firm-level political 
engagement in section 2. Section 3 describes our methodology and research hypotheses. In Section 
4, we present the data. In Section 5 we discuss our findings, and we conclude in section 6.  
2. Literature Review 
Lobbying is a strategic process in which corporations attempt to influence government officials 
and politicians. In 2012, organizations spent approximately $3.30 billion on lobbying efforts.1 
Additionally, lobbying expenditures were nine times greater than individual political campaign 
donations (Kerr et al., 2011). Direct individual donations to politicians are limited to $5,000 per 
candidate per election cycle, while there is no restriction on the amount firms can spend on 
lobbying. 2.   
Due to a potential agency problem, lobbying efforts should be implemented only if lobbying 
provides shareholder benefits. However, the managers of lobbyist firms can potentially expend 
firm resources, but fail to obtain better firm performance for the shareholders. When the agency 
costs of lobbying are low, lobbying may contribute the firm value by providing high excess returns 
(Mathur et al., 2013; Borghesi and Chang, 2012). Such an explanation of lobbying behavior is 
consistent with our results showing both Democrat-leaning and Apolitical CEOs engage in less 
lobbying by expending less on lobbying activities, compared to Republican-leaning CEOs. 
Lobbying efforts have the potential to modify official legislative acts, which could lead to changes 
in firm revenue, sales and expenditures, by providing tax policy benefits (Richter et al., 2009), 
                                                          
1 http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ 
2 http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml 
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influencing visa and trade policy (Kerr et al., 2011), or preventing corporate fraud detection (Yu 
and Yu, 2012). Lobbying is also found to be positively related to market and accounting measures 
of firm performance (Chen et al., 2015), serves shareholders’ interests by increasing firm value 
(Hill et al., 2013), promotes accounting conservatism (Kong et al., 2013), and increases firm value 
for corporations operating in heavily regulated industries (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2000).  
Outperforming PAC donations, lobbying expenditures doubled between 1999 and 2006, when 
firms recognized the importance of effective lobbying (Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012). Subsequently, 
firms are found to increase their lobbying expenditure if the political geography shifts to an area 
that is not closely affiliated with the President (Antia et al., 2013). More importantly, firm lobbying 
actions are determined by the amount of entry cost (Bombardini, 2008).  
The critical issue of firm involvement in politics is whether firms actually gain benefits from 
engagement. The main reason for firm lobbying is to access favor from the American political 
system (de Figueiredo and Richter, 2013). U.S. firms that make donations to political campaigns 
are found to have well established access to politicians (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998). 
Additionally, lower agency costs of free cash flow are reported for politically diverse boards, with 
regard to their corporate PAC3 contributions (Kim et al., 2013). Similarly, PAC contributing firms 
are reported to exhibit better stock performance, while helping corporations develop a relationship 
with politicians (Goldman et al., 2009), which again yield to positive stock price reactions if the 
supported candidate is elected (Cooper et al., 2010).   
For this reason, it is legitimate that firms may decide to enter politics in a manner in which they 
presume political connections as a feasible opportunity to establish shareholder wealth. Lobbying 
is one such political involvement, as well as PAC contributions. Firms are found to spend larger 
amounts in lobbying efforts, compared to PAC activity (Hill et al., 2013). Since firms allocate 
greater expenditures on lobbying, influencing legislative proposals would benefit the firms in 
terms of greater success in securing bailout assistance (Duchin and Sosyura, 2012), decreased taxes 
on firms’ repatriated earnings (Alexander et al., 2009), lower effective corporate tax rates (Richter 
                                                          
3 Political Action Committee, designed for the aim of raising and spending money to either elect or defeat political 
candidates. Most of the political contributions are introduced as business, labor or ideological interests. 
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et al.; 2009), and a higher likelihood to receive more TARP (Trouble Asset Relief Program) funds 
(Blau et al., 2013), which suggests that lobbying serves shareholder interests. 
A vital issue in firm political engagement is whether managers are using firm resources for private 
gain. Thus, there may actually be an agency issue in which CEO decisions regarding political 
actions is driven by self-interest. Richter et al. (2009) suggests that lobbying activity is not 
completely observable and, therefore, not all of its outcomes are traceable into law. As a result of 
this agency cost problem, lobbying has no effect on Tobin’s Q and does not create any long term 
benefit for the corporation (Hersh et al., 2008). Lobbying could be derived from unethical practices 
(Borisov et al., 2014), and lobbyist CEOs earn greater compensation, compared to CEOs of non-
lobbying firms (Skaife et al., 2013). Besides, political engagement may result in lower cumulative 
abnormal returns, compared to firms with no donations, (Aggarwal, et al., 2012) or contributions 
may not serve shareholder interests, but rather, contributions become the personal and political 
instruments of the CEOs and other executives, resulting in higher agency costs (Bebchuk and 
Jackson, 2010).  
Although it may be true that political connections attract firms to engage in lobbying actions, our 
work highlights the potential implication of a resulting severe agency cost problem. Our research 
is similar to Skaife et al., (2013), Borghesi and Chang (2012), Hill et al. (2013), who analyze the 
value of lobbying, but we differ from them by analyzing the influence of CEO political ideology 
on lobbying efforts. Departing from other major empirical findings regarding lobbying effort and 
firm performance, we conclude that high levels of lobbying action lowers firm value and increases 
agency conflicts that are borne by shareholders. 
3. Methodology  
In estimating parameters in our empirical models, the political ideology of CEOs is the main 
explanatory variable. We also include a set of firm specific control variables to measure the 
relationship between corporate lobbying and firm performance. 
Following Hutton et al. (2015), the political ideology of a CEO is measured by 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐷 =
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
    (1) 
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The variable Cpid is a measure with boundaries of +1, which is equal to extreme Republican and 
(-1), which is equal to extreme Democrat. If a CEO does not make any contribution that year, we 
assume Cpid = 0. To identify the relationship between lobbying and CEO political ideology and 
other control variables on the financial well-being of companies, we use two approaches: Linear 
logistic regression and fixed effect panel regression. 
Our main focus is to examine how CEO political orientation determines firm value in response to 
lobbying strategy. At the same time, we acknowledge the potential agency conflict inside the 
lobbyist firms if the lobbying decisions are driven by CEO self-interest, rather than protecting 
shareholder wealth. For that reason, we examine the lobbying effort of politically diverse 
managers, while considering a possible agency problem. For this purpose, we hypothesize that 
H.1: All other things equal, Republican managers lobby a larger number of bills. (𝛽1>0) 
• Number of Bills = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1RepCeo +∑ 𝛽𝑠 Controls      (2) 
The number of bills is the log transformation of the number of bills lobbied in a given calendar 
year. RepCEO is a binary variable and equal to one if Cpid > 0 and zero otherwise. RepCEO 
estimates how many more bills are lobbied by firms with Republican-leaning managers, compared 
to rivals. Controls include firm specific variables such as firm size, financial leverage, tangibility, 
ROA, Herfindahl Index, and firm age. 
H.2: All other things equal, Republican CEOs expend on lobbying. (𝛽1>0) 
• Lobbying Expenditure = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1RepCeo +∑ 𝛽𝑠 Controls     (3) 
Lobbying expenditure is the log transformation of expenditure spent on lobbying in a given 
calendar year. RepCEO is a binary variable and equal to one if Cpid > 0 and zero otherwise. 
RepCEO measures how much more is spent on lobbying by firms with Republican-leaning 
managers, compared to rivals. Controls include the same set of firm specific variables. 
H.3: All other things equal, lobbying influences CEO and board characteristics.  
• Lobbyist Firm = 𝛽0 +𝛽1CPID+ 𝛽2CEO&BoardChar+∑ 𝛽𝑠 Controls (𝛽1>0, 𝛽2>0)  (4) 
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Lobbyist firm is the dependent variable and equal to one if the firm has lobbying activity, zero 
otherwise. First, we use CPID to measure if a firm exhibits lobbying activity in response to having 
a Republican CEO. Then, we examine the potential agency problem in terms of excess CEO pay 
and board characteristics. We introduce various CEO pay forms such as salary, cash, total 
compensation, and total compensation including options. We interpret “excess” CEO 
compensation as the CEO pay which is not fully explained by the market determinants of pay 
(Core et al., 2008). We also include board specific governance variables such as CEO ownership, 
board size and busy boards. Our investigation aims to examine whether higher compensation and 
weaker governance are lobbyist firm characteristics. In this case, if lobbying fails to create firm 
value, then only the managers and not the shareholders would actually benefit from the lobbying 
action. Next, we test if greater involvement in lobbying has a positive effect on firm value; 
H.4: All other things equal, lobbying affects firm performance. 
• Firm Performance = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1LobbyBills +∑ 𝛽𝑠 Controls (𝛽1>0)   (5) 
To further investigate the impact of agency costs, we analyze the relationship between corporate 
lobbying and firm performance. In brief, finding an association between lobbying and poor firm 
performance can be explained by the agency problem and unexplained CEO compensation. In 
order to identify the effect of lobbying on shareholder wealth creation, we measure firm 
performance as Tobin’s Q, agency cost of free cash flow, and excess return over time. LobbyBills 
is a binary variable and it is equal to one if a firm is lobbying at least one bill in a given calendar 
year and zero otherwise. Controls include the same firm specific variables. We estimate the model 
by running a fixed effect panel regression4, and our main interest is the sign and magnitude of 𝛽1, 
which is the coefficient of LobbyBills.  A large and negative value of 𝛽1 indicates that lobbying 
decreases firm performance.  For all tests in the study, we also generate binary variables for each 
industry and each year to capture panel fixed effects for the analysis. 
 
                                                          
4 Std. Errors are clustered for robustness check.  
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4. Data Description  
4.1) Firm Data 
We collect personal information for CEOs (i.e. age, full name, compensation, ownership, position 
on the board) and their firm affiliations from the ExecuComp database and RiskMetrics. Our 
sample begins in 2000 and ends in 2012.5 The sample includes 2,503 unique firms, 4,585 unique 
CEOs, and political contributions for 2,037 distinct CEOs for a total of 22,061 firm-year 
observations between 2000 and 2012. To measure firm performance, control variables are gathered 
from COMPUSTAT and the Center for Research Security Prices. We include all industries (no 
SIC restriction) and group them by their Fama-French 12 Industry classification and generate 12 
industry dummy variables, such as Consumer Nondurables, Manufacturing, Oil-Gas and Coal 
Extraction Products, Wholesale, and Retail. 
4.2) Political Contributions 
Our motivation is to measure whether the political orientations of managers influence lobbying 
activities. Therefore, the CEOs’ political orientation is the key variable of our paper. First, we 
identify a manager’s political view by tracking his or her personal or PAC financial contributions 
to both Democratic and Republican parties during elections (senate, house, presidential and 
gubernatorial).  
The financial contributions to political parties, candidates, or committees can be found on the 
Federal Election Committee (FEC) website.6 The contribution files include the contributor’s name, 
occupation, year, and the amount of the money donated, among other variables. We match the 
executive names from ExecuComp with the FEC data to observe CEO donations. Most of the 
CEOs report their occupation or current employment position in the FEC contribution files. It is 
less likely to obtain the best matching results using computer based matching algorithm. Hence, 
we hand correct our results by name, surname, and suffixes (i.e. Mr, Mrs, Jr, II.) after matching 
ExecuComp names with the FEC data. 
                                                          
5 Our RiskMetrics data starts from 1998, but since some of the important variables before 1998 are missing; 
ExecuComp is used to calculate firm and CEO specific characteristics. 
6 Election data starts from 1979 in  http://www.fec.gov 
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4.3) Lobbying Information 
Lobbying information is gathered from the Center for Responsible Politics (CRP). 7 The data 
contain U.S firms that are lobbying in a given calendar year. We calculate the expenditure amount 
spent on lobbying, the number of bills lobbied, the name of the lobbyist, and the topic of the bills 
using the CRP database. We match the CRP data with our firms in the ExecuComp database by 
company name and year to find publicly traded firm contributions between 2000 and 2012. We 
also use the Congressional Bills Project database8 to track the lobbied bills that are passed in both 
the Senate and House of Representatives. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our sample at the individual CEO and firm levels. As shown 
in Panel A, over the 12 year span of our sample period, CEO donations averaged $2,643 yearly, 
while Republican candidates received almost $3,000 more in contributions than Democratic 
candidates. In addition, the mean of Cpid is 0.18 for the managers in our study, suggesting that 
CEOs are more aligned with the Republican Party. 
Panel B of Table 1 represents lobbying characteristics at the firm level. The number of bills lobbied 
is different than the number of issues lobbied, since one bill is able to contain several issues (topics) 
in it. The mean of number of bills lobbied is 3.97 and is smaller than the mean number of issues 
lobbied of 8.69. We also find average lobbying expenditure per bill is approximately $610,000, 
yearly. Moreover, we report bills which are lobbied in U.S Senate and U.S House of 
Representatives. The average number of bills lobbied in the U.S. legislature is greater than the 
average number of bills passed to become law. Therefore, our findings may suggest that not all the 
bills are able to gain enough votes to overcome legal procedures. As a result, some firms increase 
their lobbying expenditure over time until the bill becomes law.  
Panel C of Table 1 exhibits the CEO and board characteristics, and Panel D of Table 1.a reports 
results regarding the control variables used in the study. The detailed definitions of variables are 
described in the Appendix.  
 
                                                          
7 www.opensecrets.org/lobbying 
8 http://www.congressionalbills.org/ 
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our sample (2000-2012), reporting the full sample summary statistics for measures 
of political values, lobbying variables, and control variables. Detailed definitions of variables are reported in the appendix. 
Panel A summarizes information of political contributions of 2,037 individual CEOs used in this study. Panel B lists 
calculated summary statistics of lobbying characteristics Panel C lists summary statistics of CEO and board characteristics. 
Panel C lists calculated summary statistics of control variables. 
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Variables N Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max 
       
Panel A. Political characteristic at CEO level 
Annual Donation 22,061 2,643.87 0.00 13,355.39 0.00 500,000.00 
CPID 22,061 0.18 0.00 0.58 -1.00 1.00 
Donation to Rep. Party (Yearly) 7,973 6,004.07 1,000.00 20,602.17 0.00 683,000.00 
Donation to Dem. Party (Yearly) 7,973 3,094.62 0 14,648.12 0.00 542,402.00 
   
 
   
Panel B. Lobbying characteristics at Firm level 
N. of Bills Lobbied 22061 3.97 0.00 10.62 0.00 278.00 
Total Lobbying Amount 22061 609,785.50 0.00 7,106,778 0.00 995,000,000 
N. of Issue Lobbied 22061 8.69 0.00 24.04 0.00 441.00 
N. of Issue Lobbied at Senate 22061 3.09 0.00 8.53 0.00 225.00 
N. of Issue Lobbied at House 22061 3.08 0.00 8.50 0.00 234.00 
N. of Bills Passed at House 22061 0.35 0.00 1.88 0.00 67.00 
N.of Bills Passed at Senate 22061 0.31 0.00 1.43 0.00 37.00 
N. of Bills Became Law 22061 0.28 0.00 1.20 0.00 31.00 
N. of Lobbyist Emp. 22061 4.68 0.00 13.39 0.00 274.00 
N. of Lobbyist Emp. as Congressman 22061 0.14 0.00 0.64 0.00 23.00 
   
 
   
Panel C. CEO and Board Characteristic  
Board Size 16,609 9.38 9.00 2.59 3.00 34.00 
Proportion of Busy Directors 22,061 0.18 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 
CEO Compensation 21,932 5,286.40 3,016.46 9,298.95 0.00 600,347.35 
CEO Compensation (Opt. Included) 22,022 5,911.38 2,573.28 20,014.73 0.00 2,278,668.21 
CEO Ownership 21,525 0.42 0.03 18.60 0.00 2,463.62 
CEO Salary 22,061 724.59 671.62 403.56 0.00 8,100.00 
CEO Bonus 22,061 504.58 0.00 1,498.44 0.00 76,951.00 
CEO Cash 22,061 1,229.17 866.25 1,646.22 0.00 77,926.00 
CEO Gender 22,061 0.97 1.00 0.16 0.00 1.00 
CEO Age 21,390 55.45 55.00 7.45 28.00 96.00 
   
 
   
Panel D. Control Variables 
Size 22,061 7,392.82 1,475.00 23,774.83 0.00 504,239.58 
Tobin's Q 22,058 1.88 1.42 1.55 0.49 35.11 
Leverage 22,061 0.23 0.20 0.99 0.00 120.94 
ROA 22,061 0.07 0.08 0.14 -3.75 0.39 
Tangible 22,061 0.25 0.18 0.23 0.00 0.94 
FCF 21,527 0.03 0.04 0.15 -4.46 0.25 
Firm Age 22,061 25.61 20.00 16.65 1.00 62.00 
HHI 22,061 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.01 1.19 
 
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for donor managers during all election cycles from 1993 to 2012. Managers who are making at least one donation in given 
election cycle are identified as donors. % Donor is the percentage of managers that donate in a given election cycle. Mean$ contribution is the average dollar 
amount given to political parties. Rep$ and Dem$ refer to dollar amount donated to Republican and Democratic parties, respectively. Polarizer indicates the 
managers who make all contributions to either Republican- or Democratic parties. %Pol is the total number of polarizes as a percentage of total number of donor 
CEOs. REPDUMMGR is the cycle-specific Republican dummy for donor managers, which takes the value of one when all donations of the manager go to the 
Republican Party in that cycle and zero otherwise. The 1993-10 row reports the summary statistics for all unique donor managers. 
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Table 2 
Political Orientation of Managers 
   Donors (3-4) Contributions (5-7)   Polarizer (10-12) Cycle Specific 
Cycle Num. Don All N(Donor) %Don Mean$ Rep$ Dem$ N(Rep) N(Dem) Pol(Rep) Pol(Dem) %Pol  REPDUMMGR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
1993-94 7,833 2,708 943 34.82% $3,793  $1,920  $1,870  577 351 412 278 73.17% 0.61 
1995-96 10,237 3,251 1,263 38.85% $5,710  $3,879  $1,829  905 343 778 188 76.48% 0.72 
1997-98 8,961 3,405 1,065 31.28% $4,219  $4,164  $1,969  729 285 625 212 78.59% 0.68 
1999-00 12,074 3,603 1,287 35.72% $9,554  $5,921  $3,627  932 347 830 206 80.50% 0.72 
2001-02 8,941 3,346 858 25.64% $5,634  $3,077  $2,556  552 298 382 305 80.07% 0.64 
2003-04 13,759 3,494 1,158 33.14% $7,002  $4,915  $2,086  808 340 659 244 77.98% 0.70 
2005-06 10,355 3,621 843 23.28% $7,412  $4,619  $2,703  560 276 451 221 79.72% 0.66 
2007-08 15,989 4,142 1,205 29.09% $9,765  $5,888  $3,873  777 424 563 357 76.35% 0.64 
2009-10 12,427 3,921 948 24.18% $7,688  $4,067  $3,561  584 364 389 358 78.80% 0.62 
2011-12 17,636 3,680 1,083 29.43% $16,481  $12,921  $3,554  758 325 637 204 77.65% 0.69 
1993-12 118,212 35,171 11,004 31.29% $8,103 $5,316 $2,770 7,465 3,539      5,827  2,633 76.88% 0.67 
 
 
Table 2 exhibits statistics for CEO political donations per election cycle in a similar approach to 
Hutton et al. (2014). Number of Donations refers to the number of each distinct donation made by 
CEOs in the election cycle. Based on our data, the number of donations substantially increases in 
U.S Presidential Elections cycles (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012). Mid-year elections are 
associated with U.S Senate, U.S House and gubernatorial (governor) elections. Number of CEO is 
the number of managers reported in ExecuComp for a given year. Donor is the CEOs who made 
at least one donation in a given election cycle. 31% of CEOs in our sample are labeled as a donor. 
Indeed, Table 2 shows that the mean donation made to the Republican Party is higher than the 
Democratic Party through all election cycles. The average contribution made by CEOs in our 
sample is $8,103, of which $5,316 is to the Republican Party, and $2,770 is to the Democratic 
Party.  
In Table 2, we also observe that the number of Republican CEOs is more than twice the number 
of Democratic CEOs (7,465 vs. 3,539). This difference becomes even larger in Presidential 
Election years. Therefore, CEOs in our sample who are making at least one donation in a given 
election cycle are more likely to be Republican leaning CEOs. While individual and PAC 
donations may be made to both parties, some managers donate to only a single party, and these are 
reported under Polorizer. We find that 76.88% of CEOs make all donations completely to either 
the Republican Party or Democratic Party, and we define one-party contributors as polarizers. 
Different from firm level PAC contributions, individual CEO donations may also be motivated to 
gain political favors, or to represent the political orientation of a diverse shareholder base (Hutton 
et al. 2014). In brief, political donations of each individual manager are more likely to show their 
particular political ideologies and could be used as a proxy to identify their firm-level financial 
decisions. Lastly, REPDUMMGR is the cycle-specific Republican dummy for donor CEOs, which 
takes the value of one when all donations of the manager go to the Republican Party in that cycle 
and zero otherwise. 
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Panel B. Lobbying Across Industries 
Industry Num.Firms 
Num.Firms  
Lobbying 
% of Firms  
Lobbying 
Lob.  
Exp. 
Consumer Non-Durables 1354 418 31%  $        638,437,575  
Consumer Durables 637 187 29%  $        175,996,923  
Manufacturing 2630 826 31%  $      1,403,637,593  
Oil, Gas and Coal Extraction 906 357 39%  $        802,816,859  
Chemical and Allied Products 706 323 46%  $        368,269,979  
Business Equipment 4243 1156 27%  $      1,667,275,826  
Telephone and Television Transmission 540 285 53%  $        985,493,228  
Utilities 1056 677 64%  $      1,267,904,660  
Whole Sale, Retail and Some Services 2675 532 20%  $      1,448,450,004  
Healthcare, Medical and Drugs 1782 829 47%  $      1,506,210,588  
Finance 2869 977 34%  $      1,761,186,885  
Other 2668 971 36%  $      1,426,798,143  
Table 3 exhibits lobbying firms’ characteristics in firm and industry level. Panel A shows the yearly distribution 
of the proportion of lobbying firms between 2000 and 2012 and average lobbying expenditures spent in calendar 
year. Panel B shows lobbying distribution of the Fama-French 12 industry classification system with the amount 
spent on lobbying activities. 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Lobbyist Firm and Industry Details     
Panel A. Lobbying Firm Characteristics 
Year 
Num. 
Firms Num. Firm Lobbying % Firms Lobbying Average Lobbying Expenditure 
2000 1687 537 32% $923,863.04 
2001 1595 551 35% $945,832.94 
2002 1592 567 36% $1,053,251.84 
2003 1642 612 37% $1,090,820.89 
2004 1651 617 37% $1,206,354.39 
2005 1644 667 41% $1,201,210.77 
2006 1720 714 42% $1,316,801.71 
2007 1882 741 39% $1,456,917.83 
2008 1815 725 40% $1,801,042.39 
2009 1779 742 42% $3,192,902.30 
2010 1740 738 42% $1,933,055.30 
2011 1684 710 42% $1,798,518.70 
2012 1630 681 42% $1,803,086.34 
2000-2012 22061 8602 39% $1,517,204.50 
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Table 3 presents lobbying firm and industry characteristics in our sample. Panel A of Table 3 
exhibits the firm characteristic statistics obtained from the ExecuComp database. We observe the 
proportion of firms lobbying increases over time, as well as the average lobbying expenditure. In 
Panel B, we report substantial differences between lobbying industries. The industries are adjusted 
by the Fama-French 12 industry classification system. The utilities industry is the leading lobbyer, 
with a lobbying proportion of 64% and a lobbying expenditure of more than $1 million USD. The 
health and medical industry is the next highest, with the proportion of 47% lobbyers and around 
$1.5 million USD average expenditure.  
5. Empirical Results 
5.1) Lobbying Activity of Politically Diverse Managers 
Table 4 is designed to compare the mean score of two groups. Since our main objective is to 
investigate political ideology on lobbying outcome, we split our managers in two subgroups: 
Republican managers and others managers (Democrat and Apolitical CEOs)9. In Panel A, we 
compare subgroups by firm specific variables. The univariate analysis shows that Republican 
leaning firms are larger in market size and less leveraged compared to their rivals. In addition, they 
have higher ROA and higher tangibility with slightly less Tobin’s Q.  
In Panel B, we examine CEO pay and board characteristics at the managerial level by again 
comparing subgroup means. First, we find that Republican firms have a higher proportion of busy 
boards and larger board size. Second, Republican firms outperform their competitors in all forms 
of CEO pay. To put it briefly, Republican CEOs have higher salary, cash, bonus and overall total 
compensation, compared to their counterparties. For this reason, the higher CEO pay of 
Republican managers with relatively weak corporate governance may support the existence of a 
possible agency problem (Skaife et al. 2013).   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 CEOs are assumed to be Republican if CPID is greater than zero. Other managers are defined as CPID is less than 
or equal to zero. 
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Table 4 
Univariate Test 
       
       
Variable N 
Republican 
[1] 
N Other [2] 
Difference 
[1]-[2] 
T-statistics 
Panel A. Firm Characteristic       
Market Cap. 8493 9,438.10 13568 6,112.60 3,325.50 [10.13]*** 
Ln(Size) 8493 7.61 13568 7.22 0.39 [16.10]*** 
Leverage 8493 0.26 13568 0.21 0.05 [4.15]*** 
ROA 8493 0.08 13568 0.07 0.01 [3.43]*** 
Tobin’s Q 8493 1.78 13565 1.93 -0.15 [-6.95]*** 
FCF 8241 0.03 13286 0.03 0.00 [0.06] 
HHI 8493 0.21 13568 0.22 -0.01 [6.01]*** 
Tangible 8493 0.28 13568 0.22 0.06 [19.15]*** 
Firm Age 8493 27.99 13568 24.13 3.86 [16.79]*** 
  
 
    
Panel B. CEO and Board Characteristic  
 
    
CEO Age 8215 56.51 13175 54.76 1.75 [16.89]*** 
Proportion of Busy Directors 6627 0.49 9809 0.442 0.05 [12.75]*** 
Board Size 6733 9.69 6733 9.17 0.51 [12.64]*** 
CEO Gender 8493 0.98 13568 0.97 0.01 [6.95]*** 
CEO Ownership 8271 0.32 13254 0.47 -0.15 [0.57] 
CEO Compensation 8446 5,740.00 13486 5,002.30 737.70 [5.72]*** 
CEO Compensation (Opt. Included) 8481 6,409.90 13541 5,599.20 810.70 [2.93]*** 
CEO Salary 8493 778.50 13568 690.90 87.60 [15.78]*** 
CEO Bonus 8493 546.60 13568 478.30 68.30 [3.29]*** 
CEO Cash 8493 1,325.10 13568 1,169.20 155.90 [6.85]*** 
 
      
 
      
Panel C. Lobbying Characteristics 
      
Total Bills 8493 4.90 13568 3.38 1.52 [10.31]*** 
Total Amount 8493 718,100 13568 541,985.00 176,115.00 [1.79]* 
Total Number of Issue 8493 10.77 13568 7.38 3.39 [10.20]*** 
Number of Issue Lobbied at Senate 8493 3.84 13568 2.62 1.23 [10.41]*** 
Number of Issue Lobbied at House 8493 3.83 13568 2.61 1.22 [10.39]*** 
Number of Bills Passed at House 8493 0.41 13568 0.31 0.10 [3.79]*** 
Number of Bills Passed at Senate 8493 0.36 13568 0.27 0.09 [4.45]*** 
Number of Bills Became Law 8493 0.33 13568 0.24 0.09 [5.59]*** 
Number of Lobbyist Emp. 8493 0.18 13568 0.13 0.05 [5.67]*** 
Number of Lobbyist Emp. as 
Congressman 
8493 5.84 13568 3.95 1.89 [10.24]*** 
 
      
 
Panel D. Lobbying Issues 
      
Accounting 8493 0.03 13568 0.03 0.00 [0.63] 
Agriculture 8493 0.26 13568 0.17 0.09 [3.85]*** 
Banking 8493 0.55 13568 0.31 0.25 [5.63]*** 
Bankruptcy 8493 0.12 13568 0.06 0.07 [4.21]*** 
Budget 8493 1.12 13568 0.82 0.30 [5.63]*** 
Chemicals/Chemical Industry 8493 0.13 13568 0.06 0.07 [6.30]*** 
Clean Air & Water (Quality) 8493 0.35 13568 0.21 0.14 [6.22]*** 
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Economics 8493 0.06 13568 0.05 0.02 [2.31]** 
Copyright/Patent/Trademark 8493 0.46 13568 0.40 0.06 [1.47] 
Financial 
Institutions/Investments/Securities 
8493 0.67 13568 0.50 0.18 [3.87]*** 
Defense 8493 0.93 13568 0.78 0.14 [1.64] 
Education 8493 0.18 13568 0.10 0.08 [4.25]*** 
Energy 8493 1.24 13568 0.75 0.49 [8.32]*** 
Environmental/Superfund 8493 0.87 13568 0.51 0.36 [8.74]*** 
Food Industry (Safety, Labeling, etc.) 8493 0.20 13568 0.14 0.06 [2.57]** 
Foreign Relations 8493 0.15 13568 0.12 0.03 [2.05]** 
Fuel/Gas/Oil 8493 0.18 13568 0.07 0.11 [7.60]*** 
Natural Resources 8493 0.21 13568 0.11 0.10 [5.91]*** 
Gaming/Gambling/Casino 8493 0.01 13568 0.02 -0.01 [-2.19]** 
Government Issues 8493 0.25 13568 0.19 0.07 [3.64]*** 
Health Issues 8493 1.27 13568 0.85 0.42 [6.51]*** 
Intelligence and Surveillance 8493 0.04 13568 0.01 0.03 [4.06]*** 
Homeland Security 8493 0.34 13568 0.28 0.06 [2.26]** 
Housing  8493 0.17 13568 0.08 0.09 [3.97]*** 
Immigration 8493 0.20 13568 0.12 0.08 [3.83]*** 
Insurance 8493 0.25 13568 0.13 0.12 [5.41]*** 
Communications/Broadcasting/Radio/TV 8493 0.24 13568 0.24 0.00 [0.06] 
Labor Issues/Workplace 8493 0.54 13568 0.34 0.21 [6.24]*** 
Law Enforcement 8493 0.19 13568 0.10 0.09 [5.99]*** 
Manufacturing 8493 0.11 13568 0.06 0.05 [4.37]*** 
Marine/Maritime/Boating/Fisheries 8493 0.07 13568 0.04 0.03 [3.35]*** 
Media (Information/Publishing) 8493 0.02 13568 0.03 -0.01 [1.70]* 
Medical/Disease Research/Clinical Labs 8493 0.10 13568 0.05 0.05 [5.40]*** 
Medicare/Medicate 8493 0.74 13568 0.47 0.28 [5.32]*** 
Postal 8493 0.10 13568 0.07 0.03 [2.04]** 
Railroads 8493 0.17 13568 0.10 0.07 [2.87]*** 
Real Estate 8493 0.05 13568 0.03 0.03 [3.65]*** 
Retirement 8493 0.23 13568 0.18 0.06 [2.91]*** 
Roads/Highway 8493 0.06 13568 0.03 0.03 [4.22]*** 
Science/Technology 8493 0.22 13568 0.15 0.07 [3.87]*** 
Small Business 8493 0.05 13568 0.03 0.02 [2.57]** 
Taxation/Internal Revenue Code 8493 2.29 13568 1.47 0.82 [9.86]*** 
Telecommunications 8493 0.77 13568 0.56 0.22 [2.15]** 
Trade (Domestic & Foreign) 8493 0.95 13568 0.64 0.31 [7.48]*** 
Transportation 8493 0.53 13568 0.35 0.19 [6.25]*** 
Travel/Tourism 8493 0.01 13568 0.03 -0.02 [-3.21]*** 
Utilities 8493 0.25 13568 0.13 0.12 [5.74]*** 
Veterans 8493 0.06 13568 0.03 0.03 [3.18]*** 
Waste 
(hazardous/solid/interstate/nuclear) 
8493 0.12 13568 0.05 0.07 [6.62]*** 
Welfare 8493 0.01 13568 0.00 0.01 [2.40]** 
Table 4 reports the estimates of T-statistics from variables listed between 2000 and 2012. Panel A. exhibits the firm specific 
variables used in the study. Panel B shows CEO and Board characteristic variables. Panel C shows the main lobbying 
indicators. Panel D shows the detailed lobbying issues. CEOs are assumed to be Others if CPID is less and equal to zero, and 
are assumed to be Republican when CPID is greater than zero. In column (1)-(2), we report the differences in means of given 
variables and T-test results. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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In Panel C, we analyze firm lobbying involvement from various dimensions. Our results confirm 
that there is a significant statistical difference between Republican firms and other firms in terms 
of lobbying effort. We report that firms with Republican CEOs are more profoundly involved in 
lobbying to impact the legislation that they assume would benefit the firm. We find that Republican 
leaning firms lobby a larger number of bills and their bills include more than one issue (topic) 
coded. Moreover, Republican leaning firms have higher lobbying expenditures and they lobby 
more bills in both the U.S Senate and U.S House of Representatives. As a result, more bills are 
successfully passed in both U.S legislative bodies and  become law for Republican firms. In 
addition, Republican firms hire more lobbyists and more of those lobbyists are former 
Congressmen. Our findings support the evidence that firms with Republican managers are leaders 
in lobbying and use all lobbying channels to alter legislative actions on behalf of their firm.  
In Panel D, we examine the lobbying issues (topics) that are most frequently lobbied in our 
database. We report 50 types of issues that are lobbied by firms during each calendar year. 
Republican CEOs lobby a higher number of bills in 44 of the subtopics, compared to other CEOs, 
and the results are statistically significant.  
Our univariate analyses report a more profound involvement in lobbying activity for Republican 
CEOs. While firms having Republican managers are found to follow less risky corporate decisions, 
have less debt and leverage, hold less tangible assets, and make safer investments (Hutton et al. 
2014), we report that the Republican managers drive greater lobbying expenditures, lobby a larger 
number of bills, employ more lobbyists and recognize lobbying as an overall corporate strategy. 
5.2) Association between lobbying and CEO Political Ideology 
 
In Table 5, we test our first hypothesis and estimate equation (2) to determine the relation between 
lobbying activities and manager political orientation. We describe lobbying activities as the 
number of bills lobbied and lobbying expenditures. In column (1), we regress the log 
transformation of the number of bills lobbied on Repdum and other firm control variables. Repdum 
is a binary variable and equal to one when Cpid > 0 and zero otherwise. Therefore, Repdum 
represents the firms with Republican-leaning managers.  
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Table 5 
Corporate Lobbying and CEO Ideology.  
Dependent Variable Ln(Number of Bills)t+1 Ln(Lob. Amount)t+1 
Sample   
  (1) (2) 
Repdumt 0.557 0.101 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Ln(Size)t 1.726 0.336 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Leveraget 0.135 0.020 
 
[0.489] [0.570] 
Tangiblet 1.433 0.210 
 
[0.015]** [0.016]** 
ROAt -3.125 -0.675 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
HHIt 2.143 0.369 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Ln(FirmAge)t 0.681 0.134 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Constant -10.690 -2.059 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Industry & Year Fixed  Yes YES 
Num.Cluster 2,400 2,400 
N 20,231 20,231 
R2 
28% 
33% 
Table 5 exhibits the relationship between lobbying intensity and manager orientation between 2000 and 2012. 
In Panel A, the dependent variable is log transformation of number of bills lobbied in given calendar year. 
Repdum is a binary variable and equal to one if CPID>0, zero otherwise. In Panel B, the dependent variable is 
log transformation of lobbying expenditure spend in USD. Other control variables are calculated from 
COMPUSTAT. All definitions of variables used in this table are in the appendix. Std. Errors are clustered for 
robustness check. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Lobbying and CEO/Board Characteristics 
Dependent Variable  Bills Lobbiedt+1 
Sample                     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CPIDt 0.069 0.073 0.074 0.077 0.078 0.077 0.074 0.089 0.074 
 [0.015]** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.024]** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Ln(CEO Compensation)t 0.194 
        
 
[0.001]*** 
        
Ln(CEO Compensation inc. Opt.)t 
 
0.120 
       
 
 
[0.001]*** 
       
Ln(CEO Salary)t 
  
0.201 
      
 
  
[0.001]*** 
      
Ln(CEO Cash)t 
   
0.152 
     
 
   
[0.001]*** 
     
CEO Ownershipt 
    
0.013 
    
 
    
[0.001]*** 
    
Ln(CEO Age)t 
     
-0.394 
   
 
     
[0.001]*** 
   
Busy Boards 
      
1.334 
  
 
      
[0.001]*** 
  
Ln(Board Size)t 
       
1.025 
 
 
       
[0.001]*** 
 
Ln(Size)t 0.579 0.609 0.635 0.633 0.661 0.664 0.651 0.688 0.659 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Leveraget 0.064 0.076 0.078 0.072 0.102 0.095 0.947 1.103 0.112 
 
0.213 0.252 0.223 0.245 0.180 0.202 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 0.137 
Tangiblet 0.480 0.453 0.426 0.445 0.390 0.443 0.221 0.038 0.418 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.066]* 0.752 [0.001]*** 
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ROAt -0.786 -0.903 -0.840 -0.884 -0.864 -0.858 -1.180 -1.259 -0.836 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
HHIt 0.708 0.699 0.694 0.691 0.717 0.721 0.511 0.566 0.689 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Ln(FirmAge)t 0.244 0.243 0.214 0.222 0.247 0.252 0.115 0.086 0.249 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Constant -7.235 -6.849 -7.271 -6.976 -6.268 -4.740 -6.569 -8.426 -6.264 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 20,075 20,192 20,231 20,231 19,730 19,589 20,231 15,227 20,231 
R2 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 22% 23% 25% 22% 
Table 6 exhibits the relationship between lobbying and firm characteristics between 2000 and 2012. Dependent variable Bills Lobbied is a binary variable an equal 
to one if a firm lobbied at least one bill in given calendar year, zero otherwise. Independent variable CPID is the political indicator between -1 (Extreme Democrat) 
and 1 (Extreme Republican). Other firm, board and CEO level characteristic control variables are calculated from COMPUSTAT and RiskMetrics. All definitions of 
variables used in this table are in the appendix. Std. Errors are clustered for robustness check. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on our regression results, we find that Republican CEOs lobby 74% more bills, compared 
to their rival Democrat and Apolitical managers. Since we hypothesize that corporate lobbying 
actions are influenced by the CEO’s political ideology, our results confirm the involvement of 
Republican oriented managers in lobbying efforts. Similar to Skaife et al. (2013), we also find 
lobbyist firms are larger (firm size) but less profitable (ROA) in terms of firm characteristics.  
In column (2), we test the relationship between lobbying expenditure and CEO political ideology. 
We use lobbying amount in USD as the dependent variable after taking the log transformation. 
Likewise, we provide evidence that Republican CEOs spend 10% more on lobbying, compared to 
rival managers. Firm specific control variables show similar findings to those of the column (1) 
regression. Overall, findings from Table 5 are consistent with both our research motivation and 
our univariate analysis in which we report increased lobbying activity for Republican leaning 
managers of sample firms.   
5.3) Association between lobbying and CEO incentives 
 
Table 6 is designed to examine the relationship between lobbying and potential agency conflict in 
terms of CEO incentives and board characteristics. We estimate a logistic regression of equation 
(3), where the dependent variable Bills represents firm lobbying activity and is defined as a binary 
variable equal to one if a firm lobbied at least one bill (lobby active), zero otherwise.  
We use several forms of CEO pay such as salary, cash, total compensation and total compensation 
including options. We also introduce CEO ownership, board size and the proportion of busy boards 
to investigate whether weak governance is related to the lobbying effort. Since Core et al. (1999) 
find that CEOs earn higher compensation when board structure is less effective, we test the similar 
assumption regarding the relation between agency cost, CEO pay, and corporate lobbying.  
Results from Table 6 demonstrate strong evidence of a relationship between lobbying and excess 
CEO compensation, as well as given CEO political orientation. We run nine logistic regressions 
and report that Cpid is positive and significant in all regressions and that, if a firm is involved in 
lobbying activities, the manager is more likely to be Republican, which is consistent with our 
previous findings.  
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Further, we report that all CEO pay incentives are positive and suggest that, if a firm engages in 
lobbying, the managers are more likely to receive higher compensation. In other words, Table 6 
shows a possible explanation of agency cost, where lobbyist CEOs earn greater compensation, 
compared to non-lobbyist peers. Our results are similar to Skaife et al. (2013), where lobbyist 
managers are better compensated, and Aslan and Grinstein (2011), where higher political 
connections increase CEO annual compensation. 
Next, we find that lobbyist firms are more likely to have higher CEO ownership, defined as the 
ratio of shares the CEO owns to all the firm’s shares outstanding. Additionally, if a firm exhibits 
lobbying activity, it is more likely to have a larger board as well as busy boards, where at least one 
director holds more than three seats outside the firm. Lastly, CEO age is introduced to the model, 
and our findings suggest that lobbying firms are more likely to have younger CEOs serving as the 
top executive, rather than older managers.  
Findings from Table 6 support our hypothesis of agency cost and lobbying in which we control 
for CEO pay and board specific variables. It could be the case that lobbying is positively correlated 
with “weak governance”. To emphasize, lobbyist managers may be monitored less efficiently and 
enjoy several forms of greater compensation (i.e. cash, bonus and total compensation). (Skaife et 
al. 2013) 
On the other hand, lobbying could also indirectly affect higher CEO pay in alternative ways. First, 
Sloan (1993) finds that CEO compensation is sensitive to accounting-based firm performance. 
Since lobbying activity is defined as that intended to influence regulations (i.e. tax, trade, sales, 
and product approvals) that would benefit the firm revenues, expenditures, and earnings, it is not 
surprising that lobbying increases CEO pay. In that case, if lobbying increases firm value, but this 
increase in firm value is not reflected in shareholder value, then lobbying benefits the CEOs, not 
the shareholders.  
A second indirect effect of lobbying on CEO pay could be defined as the long-run assumption. 
While some scholars view firm political engagement as a strategic investment that benefits firms 
and industries (Goldman et al., 2009; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Boubakri et al., 2012; Hill et al.. 
2013; Faccio, 2006; Niessen and Ruenzi, 2009, Cooper et al., 2010; Blau et al., 2013; Kroszner 
and Stratmann, 1998; Stratmann, 1995; and Chen et al., 2015), firms consider increasing CEO 
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compensation based on anticipated future outcomes from lobbying. In this situation, lobbying 
would increase CEO pay in the short run before generating real shareholder wealth. As a result, 
lobbying increases CEO compensation and agency costs simultaneously.  
5.4) Association between lobbying and firm performance 
 
Our main goal is to empirically test the relation between lobbying outcome and CEO political 
ideology, since the lobbying decision is made by the firm’s top management. Therefore, lobbying 
should serve to benefit the shareholders and should increase shareholder wealth, as well as increase 
firm value.  
The Lobbying Disclosure Act became law in 1995 to provide public disclosure about how much 
corporations spend on lobbying. However, the lobbying concept and the expected outcome from 
lobbying can be difficult to measure systematically. In this case, shareholders who aim to monitor 
managers and evaluate their performance may suffer due to a lack of transparency. Lobbying 
expenditure and the opacity of lobbying may introduce agency costs that result from not only the 
costs associated with the entry decision to lobbying, but also costs from the lobbying outcome 
itself. Therefore, the link between lobbying and firm performance is potentially important, because 
legislative acts can affect firm value and is shaped by lobbying efforts. 
In Table 7, to better understand the determinants of corporate lobbying and firm performance, we 
check whether lobbying creates an agency cost problem once we group our sample according to 
CEO political orientation. We measure the agency cost of free cash flow following Doukas et al. 
(2000) and Antia et al. (2010), where free cash flow is multiplied by a binary variable that proxies 
for poor growth opportunities, and it is equal to one (zero) if the firm's Tobin's Q is less (equal to 
or greater) than one. The literature suggests that, when a poorly governed corporation has a greater 
amount of free cash flow, the corporation, by definition, has higher agency cost. In our regressions, 
the Agency Cost variable is introduced one year after the firm’s lobbying decision.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 exhibits the relationship between lobbying and firm characteristics between 2000 and 2012. Dependent variable Agency cost is a product of FCF and 
Grow. FCF is free cash flow divided by assets. Grow is a binary variable equals 1 if Tobin’s Q is less than 1 (Doukas et al. (2000)). Amount is a binary variable 
and equal to one if firms have lobbying expenditure in given year. Bills is a binary variable and equal to one if firm lobbied at least one bill. Columns show 
different political ideologies of CEOs, which are Republican (CPID>0), Apolitical (CPID=0) and Democrat (CPID<0). Control variables are calculated from 
COMPUSTAT and RiskMetrics. All definitions of variables used in this table are in the appendix. Std. Errors are clustered for robustness check. Numbers in 
parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Lobbying And Agency Cost     
Dependent Variable Agency Costt+2 
Sample All  Republican Apolitical Democrat All  Republican Apolitical Democrat 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(Lob.Amount)t+1 
    
-0.009 0.022 -0.042 0.003 
 
    
0.566 [0.007]*** 0.224 0.797 
Lobbydumt+1 -0.074 0.256 -0.371 -0.005 
    
 0.618 [0.001]*** 0.216 0.973 
    
Ln(Size)t 0.150 0.039 0.332 -0.041 0.157 0.030 0.353 -0.046 
 0.104 0.533 0.109 0.287 0.122 0.644 0.117 0.243 
Leveraget 1.314 1.160 1.546 0.693 1.318 1.160 1.574 0.685 
 [0.030]** [0.054]* 0.134 [0.022]** [0.031]** [0.055]* 0.133 [0.024]** 
Tangiblet 0.003 -0.780 0.821 -0.872 0.010 -0.792 0.842 -0.876 
 0.995 [0.018]** 0.316 [0.082]* 0.983 [0.017]** 0.312 [0.079]* 
ROAt 6.761 4.790 9.812 1.408 6.749 4.811 9.786 1.412 
 [0.083]* [0.036]** 0.159 [0.001]*** [0.083]* [0.035]** 0.157 [0.006]*** 
HHIt 0.112 0.094 -0.252 0.802 0.121 0.080 -0.212 0.801 
 0.557 0.718 0.477 [0.022]** 0.524 0.761 0.541 [0.022]** 
Ln(FirmAge)t 0.068 -0.069 0.134 0.243 0.070 -0.071 0.141 0.242 
 0.309 0.551 0.144 [0.064]* 0.294 0.540 0.133 [0.064]* 
Constant -3.139 -0.799 -6.114 -0.895 -3.186 -0.731 -6.284 -0.868 
 [0.050]** 0.126 [0.073]* [0.097]* [0.056]* 0.174 [0.077]* 0.108 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Num.Cluster 2314 1,299 1,475 737 2314 1,299 1,475 737 
N 17,509 6,698 7,627 3,184 17,509 6,698 7,627 3,184 
R2 4% 3% 6% 3% 4% 3% 6% 3% 
 
 
Our key independent variables are Ln(Amount) and Lobbydum. Ln(Amount) is the log 
transformation of lobbying expenses, while Lobbydum is a binary variable and is equal to one if a 
firm has lobbied at least one bill in a given calendar year and zero otherwise, respectively. While 
most bills require an expenditure in order to be lobbied, some bills are actually lobbied by 
corporations without any expenditure. In our sample data, we find 95% of the bills are lobbied by 
firms through a certain amount of expenditure. Therefore, we use both Ln(Amount) and Bills to 
identify whether the agency cost of free cash flow is related to lobbying expenditure. The results 
of Table 7 show that lobbying does not result in an agency cost problem for Democrat and 
Apolitical managers. However, firms with Republican managers are positively and significantly 
related to the agency cost of free cash flow. Thus, our results strongly support the cost of agency 
problem that lobbying activity comes at the expense of shareholder wealth. Considering the excess 
involvement in lobbying, it is reasonable that firms with Republican oriented managers are 
confronting this agency problem.  
While we find greater CEO pay, along with weak governance, contribute to firm lobbying, our 
results are aligned with previous literature. On average, we report that Republican CEO firms have 
higher agency costs in terms of both lobbying expenditure and lobbying effort. A similar 
association is documented by Kim (2008), where lobbying introduces a principal-agent issue and 
lowers shareholder rights. Coates and John (2012) also argue that lobbying lowers the financial 
performance of firms and generates agency costs. Lobbyist CEOs may exploit firm resources for 
their own benefit rather than corporate gain (Skaife et al., 2013) and receive greater compensation 
(Aslan and Grienstein, 2012). Our findings show that the higher lobbying efforts of Republican 
managers is associated with agency conflict that is borne by shareholders. In Table 8, we study the 
effect of lobbying on firm performance, where firm performance is measured by Tobin’s Q. 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total 
assets, and in our regressions it is calculated one year following the lobbying decision. As in Table 
7, our main independent variables are lobbying amount and lobbying activity, which are main 
lobbying proxies. The OLS regression includes industry and year fixed effects and reports 
clustered standard errors for robustness of our results. We divide our sample into three sub-samples 
based on the CEO political ideology and measure the effect of lobbying on firm value. 
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Table 8 
Corporate Lobbying and Tobin's Q.  
Dependent Variable  Tobin's Qt+2 
Sample All  Republican Apolitical Democrat All  Republican Apolitical Democrat 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Lob.Amount)t+1 
    
-0.012 -0.014 -0.010 -0.004 
 
    
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.069]* 0.502 
Lobbydumt+1 -0.135 -0.179 -0.134 0.018 
    
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.040]** 0.790 
    
Ln(Size)t 0.119 0.085 0.162 0.119 0.124 0.090 0.162 0.128 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Leveraget 0.752 1.157 0.562 -0.247 0.754 1.156 0.563 -0.235 
 0.124 [0.085]* 0.404 0.480 0.123 [0.086]* 0.404 0.500 
Tangiblet -0.358 -0.421 -0.174 -0.348 -0.351 -0.413 -0.171 -0.340 
 [0.001]*** [0.019]** 0.335 0.162 [0.011]** [0.021]** 0.346 0.176 
ROAt 0.368 0.522 0.383 0.105 0.357 0.510 0.385 [0.097]* 
 0.596 0.397 0.769 0.872 0.607 0.409 0.768 0.881 
HHIt 0.074 0.179 0.142 -0.181 [0.083]* 0.190 0.142 -0.179 
 0.494 0.381 0.320 0.271 0.442 0.353 0.321 0.280 
Ln(FirmAge)t -0.284 -0.196 -0.343 -0.285 -0.283 -0.197 -0.343 -0.283 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Constant 1.823 1.683 1.735 2.085 1.781 1.644 1.722 2.037 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Num.Cluster 2329 1,313 1,481 741 2329 1,313 1,481 741 
N 17,701 6,811 7,690 3,200 17,701 6,811 7,690 3,200 
R2 14% 17% 13% 18% 14% 17% 13% 18% 
Table 8 exhibits regression analysis for the sample survey data, clustered by GVKEY, examining the relation between lobbying and firm performance between 
2000 and 2012. The dependent variable is the firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. The independent variable Amount is a binary variable and equal to one if 
firms have lobbying expenditure in given year. And Bills, is a binary variable and equal to one if a company is lobbying in given calendar year, zero otherwise. 
Columns show different political ideologies of CEOs, which are Republican (CPID>0), Apolitical (CPID=0) and Democrat (CPID<0). All definitions of variables 
used in this table are in the appendix. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 8 compares the performance of lobbying firms, depending on CEO political ideology. Since 
we report that Republican CEOs lobby more bills and spend more on lobbying activities, we expect 
to find a different outcome from corporate lobbying on Tobin’s Q for firms with Republican-
leaning managers. We find that lobbying lowers Tobin’s Q in our full sample. However, once we 
analyze the sub-samples, the decrease in Tobin’s Q is statistically significant for Republican CEOs 
(Cpid>0) and Apolitical CEOs (Cpid=0). Moreover, the decrease in Tobin’s Q is greater for 
Republican CEOs (1.5%and 17%) than for Apolitical CEOs (1.1% and 13%). The decrease in 
Tobin’s Q has the lowest magnitude for Democratic CEOs, but this decrease is statistically 
insignificant. Table 8 shows the consequences of the lobbying decision on firm value. Our findings 
present that lobbying activity influences Tobin’s Q negatively and lowers firm value, unlike Hersh 
et al (2008), which fails to find a relationship between Tobin’s Q and corporate lobbying.  
The main desire for firms to participate in political actions may be to protect themselves from the 
threats of future legislative processes. In order to change those legislative processes, firms commit 
to expend their financial resources on “lobbying expenditures”. Firm-level lobbying expenditure 
is delivered to politicians through employed lobbyists to promote the firm’s interests. Despite the 
fact that lobbying firms seek corporate gain, we find that lobbying lowers the firm value for firms 
with Republican and Apolitical managers. If a firm is involved in lobbying to establish a 
relationship with Washington, it remains as a lobbyist to reinforce the value of lobbying (Drutman, 
2011). Thus, managers may be expending more on lobbying to promote more bills in which they 
believe it would serve firm’s objectives. However, the cost of extra lobbying actually offsets the 
potential benefits. As a result, we cast doubt on the value relevance of lobbying and political 
engagement in a manner similar to Aggarwal et al. (2012). Comparatively, we perform panel 
regressions of market adjusted returns on lobbying activity, controlling for other firm 
characteristics in Table 9. Since lobbying investment is unlikely to affect same-year returns, a 
firm’s buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are calculated over the next 12, 24, and 36 months 
following lobbying activities, which is measured using a lobbying dummy variable. Given that the 
firm lobbied at least one bill for year t, the abnormal return is calculated as the difference in the  
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stock’s annual return, which is geometrically compounded using monthly returns over December 
t through November t + 1, minus the return on value-weighted market index, calculated in the same 
way over the same period.10 
Table 9 presents the regression results of estimating the relationship between lobbying and excess 
returns. Our results are mostly consistent with the prior studies in which lobbying increases stock 
returns over time (Hill et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2015). In Panel A, the first three columns show 
that lobbying firms, compared to non-lobbying firms, earn higher excess returns in the next 1, 2 
and 3 years following the lobbying action. Similarly, columns 4, 5 and 6 demonstrate that the 
amount of money spent on lobbying expenses is positively correlated with the excess returns in 
the following years. Panel A shows the results for all firms in our sample; however, our main 
objective is to determine whether the lobbying effect on stock performance differs depending on 
the political ideology of the CEO. 
Panel B examines whether firms with Republican-leaning CEOs, which are lobbying a higher 
number of bills and spending more in lobbying expenditures, earn higher abnormal returns, 
controlling for other variables. The results in the first three columns reveal that lobbying firms 
have higher excess returns over the next 12, 24 and 36 months in our Republican sample. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the difference in excess returns between lobbyers and non-lobbyers 
is lower than that of the overall sample. Likewise, in columns 4, 5 and 6, if firm has lobbying 
expenditure, it has a positive effect on the following year’s excess return, although the magnitude 
is smaller, compared that of the whole sample. Panel C presents the same regressions for firms 
with Apolitical CEOs. We observe that lobbying and the amount of the money spent on lobbying 
is positively related to the excess returns in the subsequent years. Additionally, the magnitude of 
next period’s excess returns following lobbying action is larger for firms with Apolitical CEOs, 
compared to Republican ones. 
 
 
                                                          
10 We also have the results using buy and hold abnormal returns adjusted for equal-weighted market index, the 
results are the same and available upon request. 
 
 
Table 9       
Corporate Lobbying and Stock Returns        
Sample All  
Dependent Variable ER(VW)t+1 ER(VW)t+2 ER(VW)t+3 ER(VW)t+1 ER(VW)t+2 ER(VW)t+3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Lob.Amount)t+1 
   
0.005 0.009 0.012 
 
   
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Lobbydumt+1 0.060 0.105 0.155 
   
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
   
Ln(Size)t -0.053 -0.096 -0.132 -0.054 -0.100 -0.135 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Leveraget 0.125 0.246 0.335 0.127 0.244 0.335 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Tangiblet 0.014 0.038 0.090 0.017 0.034 0.082 
 0.555 0.411 0.225 0.468 0.469 0.266 
ROAt 0.073 0.056 0.116 0.054 0.056 0.116 
 [0.092]* 0.539 0.459 0.233 0.534 0.462 
HHIt -0.026 -0.047 -0.088 -0.030 -0.052 -0.094 
 0.226 0.293 0.199 0.162 0.250 0.170 
Ln(FirmAge)t 0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.002 
 0.765 0.973 0.878 0.982 0.969 0.906 
Constant 0.486 0.796 1.011 0.485 0.823 1.041 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Num.Cluster 2,328 2,248 2,152 2,328 2,248 2,152 
N 20,331 18,022 15,790 20,331 18,022 15,790 
R2 5.6% 7.2% 7.2% 5.6% 7.2% 7.1% 
Table 9 presents the results of panel fixed effects regressions of annual abnormal stock returns on lobbying activity. Panel A exhibits the results for whole sample. 
Panel B, C and D show the results in different samples divided according to political ideologies of CEOs, which are Republican (CPID>0), Apolitical (CPID=0) 
and Democrat (CPID<0), respectively. In all Panels, the dependent variable ER(VW)t+x is a firm’s buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the next 1, 2, and 3 years 
adjusted by value-weighted market return. The independent variable Bills used in first 3 columns, is a binary variable and equal to one if a company is lobbying in 
given calendar year, zero otherwise. The independent variable Ln(Lobbying Amount) used in the last 3 columns, is log transformation of lobbying expenditure spent 
by the firm in given calendar year. The definitions of all other control variables are in the appendix. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Panel B          
Dependent Variable Republican 
Sample ER(VW)t+1 ER(VW)t+2 ER(VW)t+3 ER(VW)t+1 ER(VW)t+2 ER(VW)t+3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Lob.Amount)t+1 
   
0.003 0.004 0.007 
 
   
[0.001]*** [0.034]** [0.033]** 
Lobbydumt+1 0.033 0.053 0.0760 
   
 [0.001]*** [0.024]** [0.043]** 
   
Ln(Size)t -0.043 -0.083 -0.121 -0.044 -0.084 -0.123 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Leveraget 0.151 0.326 0.5496 0.158 0.327 0.549 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Tangiblet -0.009 -0.031 -0.035 -0.006 -0.035 -0.041 
 0.747 0.606 0.738 0.846 0.561 0.694 
ROAt 0.024 -0.088 -0.296 0.010 -0.091 -0.303 
 0.810 0.661 0.498 0.920 0.650 0.488 
HHIt -0.039 -0.087 -0.187 -0.033 -0.092 -0.192 
 0.209 0.162 [0.058]* 0.311 0.142 [0.054]* 
Ln(FirmAge)t -0.005 -0.001 0.004 -0.005 -0.002 0.002 
 0.598 0.944 0.904 0.606 0.921 0.957 
Constant 0.432 0.711 0.985 0.458 0.724 1.015 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Num.Cluster 1,365 1,279 1,184 1,365 1,279 1,184 
N 7,845 6,940 6,089 7,845 6,940 6,089 
R2 5% 7% 7% 6% 7% 7% 
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Panel C       
Sample Apolitical 
Dependent Variable ER(VW)t+1 ER(VW)t+2 ER(VW)t+3 ER(VW)t+1 ER(VW)t+2 ER(VW)t+3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Lob.Amount)t+1 
   
0.007 0.013 0.015 
 
   
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Lobbydumt+1 0.068 0.123 0.175 
   
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
   
Ln(Size)t -0.064 -0.116 -0.153 -0.066 -0.122 -0.158 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Leveraget 0.125 0.208 0.227 0.114 0.200 0.224 
 [0.001]*** [0.011]** [0.035]** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.037]** 
Tangiblet 0.059 0.160 0.282 0.063 0.159 0.275 
 0.154 [0.051]* [0.028]** 0.130 [0.055]* [0.033]** 
ROAt 0.152 0.183 0.331 0.126 0.178 0.325 
 [0.001]*** 0.106 [0.046]** [0.031]** 0.118 [0.052]* 
HHIt -0.044 -0.076 -0.069 -0.045 -0.081 -0.074 
 0.196 0.320 0.555 0.196 0.289 0.524 
Ln(FirmAge)t 0.009 0.006 -0.007 0.004 0.004 -0.005 
 0.334 0.735 0.806 0.718 0.839 0.842 
Constant 0.531 0.897 1.150 0.547 0.940 1.187 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Num.Cluster 1,519 1,431 1,354 1,519 1,431 1,354 
N 8,842 7,840 6,865 8,842 7,840 6,865 
R2 6% 8% 8% 6% 8% 8% 
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Panel D          
Sample Democrat 
Dependent Variable ER(VW)t+1 ER(VW)t+2 ER(VW)t+3 ER(VW)t+1 ER(VW)t+2 ER(VW)t+3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Lob.Amount)t+1 
   
0.005 0.010 0.015 
 
   
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Lobbydumt+1 0.096 0.163 0.246 
   
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
   
Ln(Size)t -0.050 -0.080 -0.105 -0.046 -0.080 -0.103 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Leveraget 0.102 0.216 0.227 0.125 0.214 0.228 
 0.176 0.104 0.291 0.109 0.113 0.290 
Tangiblet -0.019 -0.060 -0.071 -0.019 -0.068 -0.082 
 0.749 0.581 0.649 0.756 0.539 0.605 
ROAt -0.026 -0.067 0.072 -0.048 -0.053 0.092 
 0.743 0.703 0.741 0.552 0.762 0.674 
HHIt 0.014 0.046 -0.001 -0.011 0.035 -0.020 
 0.779 0.633 0.991 0.780 0.719 0.868 
Ln(FirmAge)t -0.007 -0.020 -0.026 -0.002 -0.017 -0.021 
 0.621 0.456 0.526 0.875 0.526 0.618 
Constant 0.524 0.793 0.797 0.412 0.809 0.813 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Num.Cluster 772 719 670 772 719 670 
N 3,644 3,242 2,836 3,644 3,242 2,836 
R2 7% 9% 8% 7% 9% 8% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D demonstrates the most striking results. Firms with Democrat-leaning CEOs experience 
the highest gain in value, measured as the excess stock return following lobbying. The lobbying 
expenditure's positive effect on the subsequent years’ excess return for the Democrat-leaning 
sample is more than twice that of the Republican sample. Equally important, lobbying firms in our 
Democrat sample encounter three times the excess returns of their lobbying Republican-leaning 
counterparts. This result is evident, since firms with Republican-leaning CEOs carry the burden of 
higher lobbying engagement. Although lobbying increases stock returns over time, the lowest 
increase is associated with Republican leaning managers, while lobbying appears to most benefit 
firms with Democrat leaning managers. This result could support our assumption that lobbying 
increases firm value only to a point. After that, the cost of excessive lobbying outweighs the 
potential benefit for the firms. 
For further investigation, we also analyze the relation between lobbying and stock return volatility. 
We calculate the standard deviation of stock returns in the years following the lobbying activity. 
Standard deviations are calculated for each year using monthly returns. Each firm is required to 
have 12 months of data in order to be included in the sample for that year. Table 10 shows the 
effect of lobbying on risk, measured as the standard deviation of stock return over the next 12 
months for the whole sample, Republican, Apolitical and Democrat samples, respectively. Results 
reveal that lobbying firms encounter higher stock return volatility in the whole sample. On the 
other hand, columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 indicate that the amount spent on lobbying is positively related 
with the following period’s variability in stock returns for all subsamples, as well as for the full 
sample.  
Table 10 also shows that firms with Democrat leaning CEOs experience slightly higher stock 
return volatility in our sample. One possible explanation of lobbying and higher stock volatility is 
that, if the lobbying activity succeeds (fails) in passing bills through U.S legislative bodies, then 
the market would react positively (negatively). In this case, lobbying effort may increase stock 
returns volatility.  
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Table 10 
Standard Deviations of Stock Returns 
Sample All Republican Apolitical Democrat 
Dependent Variable STDEVt+1 STDEVt+1 STDEVt+1 STDEVt+1 STDEVt+1 STDEVt+1 STDEVt+1 STDEVt+1 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Ln(Lob.Amount)t+1 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
 
[0.001]*** 
 
[0.001]*** 
 
[0.001]*** 
 
[0.001]*** 
Lobbydumt+1 0.006 
 
0.005 
 
0.006 
 
0.009 
 
 [0.001]*** 
 
[0.040]** 
 
[0.001]*** 
 
[0.001]*** 
 
Ln(Size)t -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Leveraget 0.020 0.021 0.012 0.013 0.028 0.029 0.020 0.022 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.030]** [0.022]** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.015]** [0.001]*** 
Tangiblet 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.020 0.020 
 0.698 0.721 0.607 0.600 0.947 0.943 0.074 [0.086]* 
ROAt -0.125 -0.126 -0.142 -0.141 -0.112 -0.115 -0.126 -0.125 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
HHIt 0.005 0.005 0.013 0.013 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.002 
 0.265 0.286 [0.048]** [0.061]* 0.811 0.926 0.719 0.815 
Ln(FirmAge)t -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.015 -0.015 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Constant 0.209 0.214 0.206 0.211 0.208 0.214 0.219 0.223 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Num.Cluster 2,009 2,009 1,159 1,159 1,318 1,318 663 663 
N 17,774 17,774 6,868 6,868 7,743 7,743 3,163 3,163 
R2 37.0% 37% 38% 38% 37% 38% 38% 38% 
Table 10 reports an analysis of the effect of lobbying activity on stock return volatility. The dependent variable is STDEVt+1 which is the standard 
deviation of stock returns calculated using monthly returns in year t+1 following the lobbying act in year t. Columns show different political ideologies 
of CEOs, which are Republican (CPID>0), Apolitical (CPID=0) and Democrat (CPID<0).  The independent variable Bills used in columns 1, 3, 5 and 7, 
is a binary variable and equal to one if a company is lobbying in given calendar year, zero otherwise. The independent variable Ln(Lobbying Amount) 
used in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8, is log transformation of lobbying expenditure spent by the firm in given calendar year. The definitions of all other control 
variables are in the appendix. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
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In our last set of tests, we use an instrumental variables regression framework to address any 
possible endogeneity issues. We instrument Cpid with the characteristics of the managers and their 
firms which predict political orientation, but have no correlation with their lobbying activity. This 
set of instruments includes three variables, City, Country of Employment, and Minority. The City 
variable is collected from the U.S. Census Bureau in which cities are ranked, based on their 
population and the degree of economic and social integration. We match the cities and firms, and 
define City1 as a binary variable, which is equal to 1 if the headquarters of the firm is located in a 
geographical region with a relatively high population density (e.g. New York, Dallas, Los Angeles) 
and zero otherwise. Country of Employment and Minority are collected from RiskMetrics and other 
internet sources.  Country of Employment determines whether the CEOs are foreign or domestic. 
It is defined as a binary variable and is equal to one if the CEO’s primary employment is a U.S. 
company (domestic CEO) and zero otherwise (foreign CEO). Minority is equal to one if the CEO 
is a minority (non-white) and zero otherwise. These instrumental variables play a role in the firm-
manager matching process, but they cannot be altered after the hiring, whereas lobbying activity 
may change over time according to the needs of the firm. As a result, the instrumental variables 
we use predict the political orientation of the managers; however, they do not have an effect on 
firm lobbying activities, which is a dynamic decision, depending on the firm’s needs over time. 
The first stage estimation of the IV regression is reported in Table 11, column (1). CEO political 
ideology is negatively related to the City 1 variable, which shows that the CEOs of firms located 
in urban areas are more Democrat-leaning. Furthermore, CEOs who are employed from a domestic 
company are more Republican-leaning, since the coefficient is positive. Conversely, we report a 
negative Minority variable, where the CEOs who are minorities are less likely to be Republican-
leaning, and all of the coefficients are statistically significant. Our results are consistent with the 
general survey on the geographic tilt of the Republican versus Democratic parties. Finally, we use 
predicted Cpid from the first stage regression as the key explanatory variable in the second stage 
regressions, where the dependent variables are the two lobbying measures. We report our findings 
from the second stage regression in columns (2) and (3). The results show that, as expected, the 
predicted Cpid has a positive coefficient for both regressions when firms lobby at least one bill 
(Billst), and report lobbying expenditure (Amount). Based on our findings from the endogeneity 
tests, we conclude that seeking political favors is not the main reason for the estimated  
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Table 11   
Instrumental Variable Estimates   
Panel A: First  
Stage Regression 
Panel B: Second 
 Stage Regression 
Panel C: Second 
 Stage Regression 
Dependent Variable:  CPID Bills Amount 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
 
  
CPIDt  1.067 0.935 
  [0.001]*** [0.011]** 
City1 -0.084   
 
[0.001]***   
Country of Emp. 0.150   
 
[0.034]**   
Minority -0.185   
 
[0.001]***   
        
CONTROLS YES YES YES 
 
 
  
Industry & Year Fixed  YES YES YES 
    
N 22061 22061 22061 
R2 3% 18% 20% 
Table 11 reports the two stage least square estimation of the instrumental variable estimation. In the first stage of Panel A, 
dependent variable is CPID (CEO Political Ideology), and instruments are City, Country of Emp. and Minority variables. 
In panel B, dependent variable is lawsuit and equal to one if firm lobbied at least one bill in given calendar year, zero 
otherwise. In Panel C, dependent variable is amount and equal to one if firm has a lobbying expenditure in given calendar 
year, zero otherwise. In Panel B and Panel C, predicted CPID is independent variable. Controls refer to firm-specific control 
variables used in previous tables, but coefficients are omitted. All definitions of variables used in this table are in the 
appendix. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively 
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relation between political orientation and lobbying activity. The empirical results reported in Table 
11 are more consistent with our main hypothesis, which assumes that managers with a certain 
political ideology are more likely to apply corporate policies, such as lobbying, based on their 
political orientation.  
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between corporate lobbying and firm performance to 
understand whether firms receive proportionate benefits from lobbying activities. Specifically, we 
study whether and how CEO political orientation is a determinant of corporate lobbying, while 
controlling for firm-specific characteristics. First, we establish a new dataset consisting of the 
political donations made by the CEOs of publicly traded firms during the U.S. election cycles from 
2000 to 2012. Using this new database, we form a simple proxy variable to identify CEO political 
ideology, which is calculated from the amount they spend on donations. Then, we construct a 
second dataset of lobbying indicators at the firm-year level, including the lobbying expenditure, 
number of bills/issues lobbied, and the number of lobbyists employed. In our analyses, we 
document a link between the lobbying activities and the political orientation of top executives. Our 
study shows that firms with Republican-leaning CEOs tend to spend larger amounts on lobbying, 
make larger corporate political donations, lobby a larger number of bills, and employ a larger 
number of lobbyists. Next, we analyze the CEO and board characteristics of lobbyist firms for 
potential agency conflict and test whether lobbying efforts are driven by manager self-interest. On 
average, we find that lobbying CEOs tend to enjoy greater compensation and managerial 
incentives, compared to their non-lobbying peers. In addition, weak governance is also associated 
with lobbying firms. In terms of firm performance, Republican-oriented firms experience higher 
agency costs, while Democrat-leaning and Apolitical firms do not exhibit significant agency costs 
from lobbying activities. This finding may be due to the large amount of lobbying expenditures 
spent by Republican-leaning managers. Lobbying reduces Tobin’s Q for Republican and 
Apolitical firms, but does not impact the Tobin’s Q of Democrat firms. The magnitude of the value 
decrease is different across the political orientation of managers; Republican CEOs are exposed to 
the highest decrease in Tobin’s Q, while the decrease is not statistically significant for Democrat 
CEO led firms.  
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Moreover, all lobbying firms experience positive abnormal stock returns; however, the abnormal 
returns for Republican-leaning firms are lowest. Our tests show that Democrat CEO led firms 
achieve the highest abnormal returns, followed by Apolitical CEO led firms, while Republican 
CEO led firm experience the lowest increase. 
We conclude that firms appear to be driven to lobby based on the political ideologies of CEOs 
rather than to gain some economic benefit. However, the results show that Democrat-leaning 
lobbying firms experience slight increases in firm value. It seems as though Democrat-leaning 
firms do experience some benefits from lobbying, while the excess returns seen by Republican-
leaning lobbying firms come at the cost of lower firm value. This is not surprising, given that 
Republican-leaning firms are shown to have higher political engagement. Perhaps there is an 
optimal amount of political lobbying, whereby the firm will receive lobbying benefits up until the 
point where the lobbying expenditure makes the lobbying ineffective, or perhaps the greater 
lobbying expenditure of Republican-leaning firms is offsetting the potential lobbying benefits. 
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Chapter 2 
Corporate Lobbying and Labor Relations: 
Evidence from Employee-Level Litigations 
1. Introduction  
 
This paper investigates the lobbying effort of US corporations and examines whether sponsoring 
labor- and employment-related bills ultimately protects shareholder value when firms are facing 
employee litigations. Lobbying is defined as a firm-level strategic action that aims at changing 
policy proposals on behalf of firms’ and/or industries’ interest, which may increase the value of 
the firms in the long run. In this paper, we examine the effect of lobbying from a different 
dimension, where firms engage in political lobbying to reduce potential harm from lawsuits that 
are filed by their own employees against the parent firms.  
Employee-related lawsuits are the fastest growing types of civil cases in the United States. Almost 
25% of all litigations in the federal court system involves employment allegations.11 In 2015, 
approximately 89,000 discrimination charges were filed against US firms (while a firm may face 
multiple charges).12 Most common litigations are filed based on discrimination (retaliation, race, 
harassment, disability, sex, age, national origin, religion, color, equal act pays, etc.), benefits, 
wage/tipping policy, layoffs, and union allegations. In 2015, US firms faced 12% chance of 
receiving an employment allegation, where 19% of the disputes resulted in defense and settlement 
costs averaging a total of $125,000.13 Given the nature of lawsuits, a legal action is likely to 
generate direct costs (i.e. attorney fees and court fees, settlements and/or judgments) and indirect 
costs (i.e. CEO turnover, reputational loss), which may eventually affect the firm performance. In 
this paper, we seek to understand the effect of lobbying on lawsuits by asking the following 
questions: Is there a systematic link between corporate lobbying and employee lawsuits? Are 
lobbying firms favored in the judicial process? And is there a bias in favor of lobbying firms that 
are involved in a lawsuit?  
                                                          
11 “Human Relationship Failures: Understanding Your Exposures to Employment Litigation” by Catherine A. Asaro 2005 
12 US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm 
13 2015 Hiscox Guide to Employee Lawsuits, http://www.hiscox.com/shared-documents/The-2015-Hiscox-Guide-to-Employee-
Lawsuits-Employee-charge-trends-across-the-United-States.pdf 
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Firm involvement in politics is defined as an advantage whereby lobbying spending, CEO-level 
contributions and/or firm-level contributions (Political Action Committee), raise political capital 
that benefits to the firm's value. (Goldman et al. 2009; Johnson and Mitton 2003; Boubakri et al. 
2012; Hill et al. 2013; Faccio 2006; Niessen and Ruenzi 2009 Cooper et al. 2010; Blau et al. 2013; 
Kroszner and Stratmann 1998; Stratmann 1995; Chen et al. 2015). In our work, we investigate the 
motivation behind the specific lobbying decision in labor topics. The prior literature provides some 
insights of why firms choose to lobby. Lobbying decision may be motivated by corporate tax-
related issues (Richter et al. 2009; Angela et al. 2013) or lobbying may be inspired by market 
power and firm size (Stephen 2012; Georgiou and Roberts 2004). The pressure from industry peers 
may drive firms into lobbying (Koh 2011), as well as the cost and benefit factors may also play a 
role in lobbying decision (Kim 2013). In addition, lobbying may be motivated by accounting-
related issues (Adere 2011), such as financial statement effect (Ndubizu et al. 1993), compliance 
costs (Hochberg et al. 2009), or disclosure proprietary costs (Sutton 1988; Hill et al. 2002; Katselas 
et al. 2011). As lobbying strategies affect both firm performance and legal processes (Yu and Yu 
2012), therefore we hypothesize that employee lawsuits, workplace disputes, and other complaints 
could also explain the entry decision to lobbying activities, as well as the amount of involvement 
in lobbying itself.  
One possible explanation between lobbying and litigation is that the successful lobbying may 
change the policies at the work place, which could save lobbying firms from further allegations or 
charges. Moreover, lobbying ties may help firms to better prepare and react to incoming policy 
changes. Certainly, firms are subjected to litigations regardless of their lobbying status, and the 
number of allegations are increasing over the years. However, our work is to understand if 
lobbying firms are protected by the political capital they built in exchange for regulatory favors. 
Therefore, we focus on case outcome, and we investigate if lobbying targets the judicial system 
for favorable results. In this case, the litigation outcome is expected to be different for lobbying 
firms compared to non-lobbying rivals that are facing similar employee allegations in the work 
place. 
The relative importance of lobbying on employee relations and firm value has not been explicitly 
investigated at the firm level in previous studies. We fill this gap in the literature by empirically 
testing a) why firms with a greater number of employee litigations sponsor more bills in labor 
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topics, b) what the lobbying characteristics of firms involved in employee litigations are, c) if there 
is a bias in favor of lobbying firms measured as case outcome, and d) whether political connections 
matter in employee allegations. Our study represents an initial analysis of a new panel dataset of 
employee-related litigations, complaints, and investigations, as well as various types of CEO- and 
firm-level political contributions. First, we analyze whether employee-related litigation is a 
determinant of corporate lobbying activity. Second, we investigate if politically connected firms 
have an advantage in employee litigations against firms that are not politically connected. Third, 
we examine whether the litigation outcome is different for lobbying firms that may ultimately 
contribute to shareholder wealth maximization.  
Our sample consists of 2,798 unique firms and 5,207 distinct CEOs from between 2000 and 2014, 
and we find strong evidence that firms with a greater number of litigations tend to sponsor bills in 
labor and employment topics. Initially, we find that firms with employee lawsuits are more likely 
to be lobbying, have larger lobbying expenditure, sponsor more bills in labor topics, and overall 
are involved in greater lobbying activity. In other words, our findings show that firms may resolve 
their employee disputes through the lobbying.  
We then examine the case characteristics in our sample. We document that lobbying firms obtain 
more dismissals by court and more withdrawals by charging parties compared to non-lobbying 
peers. We address the potential explanations of how lobbying influences the legal processes. First, 
we document that duration of the lawsuits (between the opening date and the decision date) is 
longer for lobbying firms that may force charging parties' (union or individual) withdrawal from 
the cases. We report that lobbying makes a significant difference for case duration; lobbying firms 
have a significantly lower hazard rate, which lengthens the case time-to-resolution. In this case, 
the plaintiff (employee or union) who does not have financial power to fund the litigation may 
drop the case, which would yield a biased outcome in favor of lobbying firms. 
We also investigate how firms respond to employee lawsuits. First, we find that the changes in the 
number of total litigations are positively related to the changes in number of labor-related bills. In 
other words, a greater number of labor bills may be driven by the changes in the number of 
lawsuits. Second, our results show that lawsuit firms face more volatile sponsored bill flows. And 
third, decline in the number of litigations has a positive relationship with decline in sponsored 
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bills. Hence, our results confirm that lobbying activity in labor topics align in the same direction 
of employee lawsuits.  
There are various ways for firms to be connected to politics. Firms not only incur significant 
lobbying expenditures (Chen et al. 2015; Hill et al. 2013) but also make PAC contributions 
(Cooper et al. 2010) or hire former politicians on the corporate board (Goldman et al. 2009). 
Following that, we examine whether our results remain the same if other strategies are 
implemented by the firms. Consistent with expectations, we find that firms with a greater number 
of employee disputes have more firm- (Political Action Committee [PAC]) and CEO-level 
donations, relatively larger lobbying expenditures, and employ a higher number of lobbyists 
(including former members of the US Congress). Our paper provides additional evidence on 
whether firms may influence labor-related enforcements through political expenditures.  
We further examine how firms build effective lobbying channels for regulatory favors. We believe 
that lobbying to politicians sitting on responsible committees may be more effective, since they 
occupy the position of power and are able to cater to certain interest groups. Our results show that 
a greater number of employee litigations increases the number of labor-related bills sponsored in 
the Department of Labor, Department of Justice, and National Labor Relations Board. 
Additionally, we find that more employee litigation leads to hiring more lobbyists who are linked 
to those specific agencies. Our findings may reveal the fact that lawsuits may motivate firms to 
target certain agencies that are related to judicial and labor issues, which may ultimately affect the 
case outcomes. We show that lobbying through lobbyists linked to specific government agencies 
may increase the effectiveness of lobbying due to the superior “skill” of linked lobbyists.  
We then investigate whether lobbying contributes to shareholder wealth. We measure firm value 
in two ways. First, we determine the days where labor-related bills are introduced, passed in the 
US Senate and US House of Representatives, and finally become law. We conduct an event study 
and report that lobbying firms receive positive cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) during 
announcement dates. Our results exhibit that market participants value successful lobbying activity 
where lobbying increases firm value in terms of stock returns.  
Finally, we investigate the economic effects of litigation. Firms may face economically meaningful 
losses once they are involved in allegations at court. Lawsuits may generate direct costs (fines, 
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penalties, prohibitions on commercial practices, etc.) and indirect costs (reputation effects) upon 
the filing of a suit. We show that litigation has no effect on lobbying firms, while non-lobbying 
firms suffer from reduced Tobin’s Q. We document that litigations yield negative Tobin’s Q for 
non-lobbying firms, while firms backed by lobbying do not suffer from litigations. We find that 
lobbying firms who sponsor more bills in labor topics seem to benefit from lobbying, while 
litigation comes at the cost of reduced value for non-lobbying firms.  
Our findings make three main contributions. First, we employ the first large-sample evidence on 
the impact of political connections in employee-related allegations, including unique hand-
collected employee disputes data, along with various types of political donations. Second, this 
paper provides potential answers for the motivation behind entry decision to lobby in labor-related 
issues. Third, our study adds to the growing evidence of the benefits that political spending 
provides to the firms.  
The paper proceeds as follows. We provide a summary of existing literature on firm-level political 
involvement in Section 2. Section 3 describes our methodology and research hypotheses. In 
Section 4, we present the data. In Section 5, we discuss our findings, and we conclude in section 
6. 
2. Literature Review 
 
Prior studies report significant negative effect of lawsuits on firm performance (e.g. Bhagat and 
Romano [2002]; Viscusi and Hersch [1990]), as well as causing executive officers’ and directors’ 
turnovers (Humphery-Jenner [2012]; Cheng, Huang, Li, and Lobo [2010]; Karpoff, Lee, and 
Martin [2008]; Ferris, Jandik, Lawless, and Makhija [2007]; Fich and Shivdasani [2007]), 
increasing corporate direct/indirect cost (Autore, Hutton, Peterson, and Smith [2014]), which 
lowers the firm performance in the long run. Hutton et al. (2015) documented that the litigation 
has a greater negative impact on the firm value if the CEO is more Republican leaning. While 
many of these studies focus on class action-related lawsuits between managers and shareholders, 
there is little evidence on employee lawsuits. Therefore, our work is an initial study of employee 
allegations on firm performance.  
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Lobbying is a firm-level political strategy where corporations are spending their resources to 
influence government officials. By 2014, lobbying expenditure in the US measured approximately 
$3.26 billion14. By 2015, approximately 110 organizations spend more than $45 million on labor-
related issues by employing 422 lobbyists15. Since individual donations are limited to $5,000 per 
candidate during election cycles16, lobbying spending was nine times larger than individual 
political campaign donations (Kerr et al. 2011) and doubled between 1999 and 2006 (Blanes i 
Vidal et al. 2012). Firms are found to increase or decrease their lobbying spending based on the 
political geography shifts and based on the “political color” of the US President (Antia et al. 2013).  
A large number of studies in corporate finance document the effect of lobbying on firm 
performance. Lobbying may provide high excess returns when the agency costs resulting from 
lobbying expenditures are low (Mathur et al. 2013; Borghesi and Chang 2012).  
The main goal of lobbying is to modify legislative proposals and to gain favor from the American 
political system (de Figueiredo and Richter 2013). Therefore, lobbying may influence firm-level 
operational characteristics such as revenue, sales, and other expenditures by providing tax benefit 
(Richter et al. 2009; Alexander et al. 2009), regulating visa or trade policy (Kerr et al. 2011), or 
even deferring corporate fraud detections by regulators (Yu and Yu 2012).  
Lobbying is also related to better firm performance and increases shareholder wealth, as well as 
providing accounting conservatism (Chen et al. 2015; Hill et al. 2013; Kong et al. 2013; Agrawal 
and Knoeber 2000). In our work, we also document that lobbying influences legislative actions 
that protect the firm value from potential losses from litigations, and the importance of effective 
lobbying is also found to benefit firms for providing bailout assistance (Duchin and Sosyura 2012) 
and increases the likelihood to receive more TARP (Trouble Asset Relief Program) funds (Blau et 
al. 2013), which overall suggests the contribution of lobbying to firm performance. However, firm-
level engagement in politics may also provide potential agency cost problems where managers 
may exploit firm resources for their own benefits. Lobbying activity and its effect on the firm 
performance may not be fully observable (Richter et al. 2009). Lobbying may have no influence 
on Tobin’s Q (Hersh et al. 2008) or even may be derived from unethical practices (Borisov et al. 
                                                          
14 http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ 
15 https://www.opensecrets.org/industries 
16 http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml 
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2014), which lowers firm performance. Managers from lobbying firms may earn greater 
compensation compared to non-lobbying peers (Skaife et al. 2013). Firm-level political 
involvement could yield to lower cumulative abnormal returns (Aggarawal et al. 2012) or political 
contributions to become a channel to serve CEOs' and other executives' interest (Unsal et al. 2016; 
Bebchuk and Jackson 2010), resulting in higher agency costs.  
While building political capital for better operating performance may drive firms into engaging 
lobbying strategies, our work highlights the potential benefit of lobbying in terms of legal actions 
faced by corporations. Our paper is the first of which we are aware to empirically investigate how 
corporate lobbying affects employee relations. Our research is similar to Yu and Yu (2012), who 
document the value of lobbying during corporate fraud detection, but we differ from them by using 
employee litigations, labor violations, discrimination cases, and wage allegations on lobbying 
efforts, as well as other political spending and contributions. Similar to other major empirical 
findings between lobbying effort and firm performance, we conclude that lobbying action protects 
shareholder wealth from reduced firm value. 
3. Data Description  
 
3.1) Firm Data 
 
Our study contains two main databases. First, we employ COMPUSTAT database to identify the 
publicly traded firms. We merge COMPUSTAT with ExecuComp database to identify the CEO 
names for personal donations and contributions from S&P 1500 companies. Our sample includes 
2,798 unique firms and 5,207 distinct CEOs. In our sample, we gather 730 unique lobbyist firms, 
1,718 donor CEOs, and 698 different politically active firms (PAC). To measure firm performance, 
control variables are gathered from COMPUSTAT and the Center for Research Security Prices. 
We include industries and group them by their Fama-French 12 Industry classification and 
generate twelve industry binary variables, such as Consumer Nondurables, Manufacturing, Oil-
Gas and Coal Extraction Products, Wholesale, and Retail.  
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3.2) Event Study 
 
We use CRSP daily returns for event study tests, as well as Value Weighted Market index as 
benchmark return.  
3.3) Litigation Data 
 
We hand collect a unique litigation data from The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)—an 
independent federal agency that protects the rights of private sector employees, with or without a 
union, to improve their wages and working conditions. For lawsuits, NLRB provides information 
called “Disposition of Unfair Labor Practice Charges,” which includes complaints, litigations, and 
decisions.17 The NLRB dataset contains the charging party, the legal issue in question, the party 
that is on the opposite site, and the case outcome. The first complaint issued in the dataset was 
recorded in 1976. We match case name with firms in the COMPUSTAT database by name and 
year between 2000 and 2014.  
3.4) Violations, Inspections, and Other Disputes 
 
We assume that labor-related bills may be driven not only by lawsuits but also other type of 
violations, inspections, and complaints. In addition to litigations, we also gather unique hand-
collected labor enforcement datasets from the US Department of Labor.18 First, we collect 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration enforcement data to identify the work-place safety 
inspections and violations. Second, we employ Wage and Hour Compliance Action Data for wage-
related allegations, including civil penalties. Third, we collect Employee Benefits and Security 
Enforcement Data for the benefit-related disputes that result in penalty assessments. Finally, we 
collect discrimination lawsuits that are filed against firms by employees from Bloomberg’s BNA 
Employment Discrimination Verdicts and Settlements database.19 
 
 
                                                          
17 For NLRB Litigation-Case data http://www.nlrb.gov/opengov/nlrb-data-datagov 
18 US Department of Labor Enforcement Data: http://ogesdw.dol.gov/views/data_catalogs.php 
19 https://www.bna.com/ 
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3.5) Lobbying Information 
 
Lobbying information is gathered from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP).20 The data 
contain US firms that are lobbying in a given calendar year. We calculate the expenditure amount 
spent on lobbying, the number of bills lobbied, and the topic of the bills using the CRP database. 
We match the CRP data with our firms in the COMPUSTAT database by company name and year 
to find publicly traded firm contributions between 2000 and 2014. The CRP database also allows 
us to count the number of lobbyists employed by firms, including lobbyists who were former 
members of the US Congress. We also use the Congressional Bills Project database21 to track the 
lobbied bills that are passed in both the Senate and House of Representatives.  
3.6) CEO Political Contribution 
 
We obtain the ExecuComp database to identify CEO names for our sample firms. We then gather 
CEO donation amounts from the Federal Election Committee (FEC) web page22. The campaign 
contributions to political parties, candidates, and committees are reported to the FEC and are 
publicly available. The financial contribution files include the donor name as well as occupation, 
year, and amount of money contributed. We use a computer algorithm to match the executive 
names from ExecuComp with the FEC campaign data to obtain CEO-level personal donations. 
Since most of the CEOs report their current employment position in the FEC contribution files, we 
also hand collect our results by name, firm, surname, and suffix (i.e. Mr., Mrs., Jr., II, etc.).  
3.7) Firm Political Contribution: Political Action Committee (PAC)  
 
We gather firm-level political contributions from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP).23 We 
match our publicly traded firms from COMPUSTAT with Political Action Committee reports and 
calculate total donations from the corporations to campaigns during election cycles. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for our sample at firm level. As shown in Panel A, over the 
fourteen-year span of our sample period, average lobbying expenditure is more than $298,000. In 
                                                          
20 www.opensecrets.org/lobbying 
21 http://www.congressionalbills.org/ 
22 http://www.fec.gov/data/DataCatalog.do 
23 www.opensecrets.org 
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addition, 14% of the firms in our sample are defined as lobbyists. Firms lobby a maximum of 232 
bills, while 30 bills may be sponsored specifically in labor-related issues.  
Panel B of Table 1 represents lawsuit characteristics. The average number of litigations in our 
sample is 1.00, while firms could, at maximum, face litigation up to 235 filings. Following that, 
15% of the firms in our sample face litigation that is initiated by their own employees. We also 
report summary statistics for case outcomes. We document that most litigation cases are either 
dismissed by court or more likely, are withdrawn by the charging party. Our sample includes a 
greater number of dismissals and withdrawals compared to settlements or closures with decision.  
 
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Variables N Mean Std. Min Max 
Panel A. Lobby Characteristics      
Total Lobbying Expenditure   27,896    298,634.00    1,466,836.00  0.00   45,500,000.00  
%Lobby   27,896  0.14 0.35 0.00                   1.00  
Num. of Bill Lobbied   27,896  1.88 8.71 0.00               232.00  
Num. of Labor Introduced Bill   27,896  0.08 0.60 0.00                 30.00  
Total Labor Bill Become Law   27,896  0.03 0.19 0.00                   4.00  
Labor Bill: Labor Market Development   27,896  0.01 0.06 0.00                   3.00  
Labor Bill: Worker Safety   27,896  0.01 0.11 0.00                   7.00  
Labor Bill: Employment Training   27,896  0.01 0.15 0.00                   4.00  
Labor Bill: Employee Benefit   27,896  0.04 0.39 0.00                 22.00  
Labor Bill: Labor Unions   27,896  0.01 0.18 0.00                   7.00  
Labor Bill: Fair Labor Standards   27,896  0.00 0.08 0.00                   3.00  
Labor Bill: Benefits and Other Issues   27,896  0.00 0.04 0.00                   3.00  
Panel B. Political Contributions 
CEO Political Contribution   27,896        2,698.78         13,855.60  0.00        543,402.00  
Firm PAC Contribution   27,896      20,713.34       237,393.40  0.00   22,400,000.00  
Num. of Lobbyist Employed   27,896             11.89                36.37  0.00               807.00  
Num. of Lobbyist: Former Congressman   27,896               0.34                  1.59  0.00                 36.00  
Panel C. Lawsuit Characteristics 
Num. of Litigation   27,896  1.00 6.04 0.00 235.00 
%Litigation   27,896  0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Total Case Opened by Individual   27,896  0.32 2.65 0.00 153.00 
Total Case Opened by Union   27,896  0.62 3.93 0.00 157.00 
Num of. Dismissal   27,896  0.26 1.81 0.00 77.00 
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Num. of Withdrawal   27,896  0.63 4.04 0.00 154.00 
Num. of Settlement   27,896  0.06 0.53 0.00 29.00 
Num. of Decision Complete   27,896  0.01 0.22 0.00 15.00 
%(Dismissal/Total Litigation)   27,896  0.04 0.16 0.00 1.00 
%(Withdrawal/Total Litigation)   27,896  0.09 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Coercive Actions   27,896  0.03 0.60 0.00 66.00 
Coercive Statement   27,896  0.11 0.86 0.00 46.00 
Bad Faith Bargaining   27,896  0.05 0.48 0.00 42.00 
Changes in Working Condition   27,896  0.15 1.39 0.00 118.00 
Discharge   27,896  0.17 1.32 0.00 64.00 
Discipline   27,896  0.09 0.98 0.00 72.00 
Refusal to Furnish Information   27,896  0.16 1.49 0.00 110.00 
Changes in Working Contract   27,896  0.10 0.80 0.00 53.00 
Onerous Assignment   27,896  0.01 0.13 0.00 5.00 
Concerted Activities   27,896  0.07 0.61 0.00 35.00 
Unilateral Changes   27,896  0.07 0.61 0.00 35.00 
Fair Representation   27,896  0.02 0.30 0.00 13.00 
Union Issues   27,896  0.02 0.21 0.00 9.00 
Harassment   27,896  0.01 0.15 0.00 7.00 
Other Issues   27,896  0.18 1.50 0.00 62.00 
Panel D. Inspections and Violations 
Inspections   27,896               1.02                  4.46  0.00               189.00  
Num. of Wage Complaints   27,896             35.20              327.16  0.00            5,307.00  
Total Wage Penalty   27,896        3,697.08       205,071.50  0.00   33,300,000.00  
%(Complaint/Lawsuit)   27,896               0.03                  0.38  0.00                 41.00  
Complaints: Employee Benefits & Salary   27,896               0.20                  1.44  0.00                 80.00  
Panel E. Firm Characteristics 
Ln(#Employee) 
  27,189  1.49 1.78 -6.91                   7.70  
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Book Leverage   26,203  0.24 0.94 0.00               120.94  
ROA   27,621  0.03 0.53 -33.00                 46.45  
Tangiblity   26,572  0.25 0.23 0.00                   0.98  
Tobin's Q   27,213  1.87 1.83 -0.99               147.35  
Herfindahl Index   27,633  0.22 0.19 0.01                   1.00  
Ln(#FirmAge) 
  27,633  3.06 0.71 0.00                   4.17  
Free Cash Flow   26,180  0.03 0.38 -33.00                   1.27  
% Industry Unionization   27,633  6.55 6.33 0.60                 30.70  
High Tech Firms   27,896  0.21 0.41 0.00                   1.00  
Union Membership Growth   25,952  0.02 1.26 -8.50                   6.40  
Pension Expenses   27,896  0.13 12.95 -235.43            2,005.74  
% State Unionization   27,262  13.22 6.20 1.90                 26.70  
Personal Intensity   27,189  26.34 177.07 0.01          10,277.91  
Property, Plants and Equipment   25,111  0.30 1.94 0.00               105.45  
Table 1 exhibits the summary statistics at firm level. Our sample consists of 2,812 unique firms between 2000 and 2014. Panel A represents the lobbying 
characteristics, spending and sponsored bills at firm level.  Panel B represents litigation characteristics filed by both employees and labor unions. Panel C represents 
the firms level control variables used in the study. Panel D represent case specific outcomes and charging parties grouped by Fama and French 12 industry 
classification.  
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Panel F. Lawsuit Characteristics at Industry Level 
  Total Case (1) Case Outcome (2) - (5) Charging Party (6)-(7) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Industries #TotalCase #Dismissal #Settle #Withdrawal #Completed #Individual #Union 
Consumer NonDurables                2,861                 694              201                1,815                   21                811        1,983  
Consumer Durables                1,405                 616                58                   686                   53                415           980  
Manufacturing                4,606              1,231              210                2,955                 186             1,578        2,855  
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction                   902                 221                33                   581                   29                153           688  
Chemicals and Allied Products                   799                 198                35                   520                   44                181           584  
Business Equipment                1,255                 273                59                   826                   52                345           908  
Telephone and Television Transmission                3,651                 845              181                2,475                 176                798        2,758  
Utilities                   962                 174                29                   660                   31                277           650  
Wholesale, Retail,                4,542              1,097              389                2,762                 356             1,499        3,032  
Healthcare, Medical Equipment                   511                 107                44                   325                   37                133           377  
Finance                   349                   70                31                   181                   11                143           195  
Service, Hotels, Business, Entertainment                5,951              1,601              332                3,672                 285             2,391        3,499  
Total              27,794              7,127           1,602              17,458              1,281             8,724      18,509  
 
 
We also identify lawsuit reasons and show that changes in working conditions, refusal to furnish 
information, discharge, changes in working contract, and coercive actions are some of the most 
frequent litigation types. Panel C of Table 1 reports results regarding the control variables used in 
the study. Panel D reports the litigation frequency at industry level based on Fama and French 
classification. Our final sample consists of 27,794 unique cases with 27,468 case outcomes filed 
by 27,233 charging parties.24 In column (1), we report litigation occurrence across industries. From 
column (2) to (5), we document case outcome. In column (6) and (7), we report charging party 
characteristics. Our results show that the largest number of filing against firms is located in the 
Service, Hotels, Business, and Entertainment industry, followed by lawsuits initiated against firms 
in the Manufacturing industry, followed by the Wholesale and Retail industry, respectively.  
4. Methodology 
  
4.1) Litigation, Lobbying, and Firm Performance 
 
Our main goal is to understand the motivation behind lobbying decisions in labor-related issues 
(bills) for US firms. We use employee litigations, as well as other complaints and violations, to 
examine the consequences of lobbying to adjust policy proposals. To estimate parameters in our 
empirical models, the litigation indicators are the main explanatory variables. We calculate two 
separate litigation indicators; Lawsuit is a binary variable and equal to one if firm has at least one 
litigation initiated by their employees, zero otherwise. We use the Lawsuit variable to conduct 
univariate tests to compare lobbying activities across firms in our sample. Our second indicator is 
Ln(#Litigation), which is the log transformation of the total number of lawsuits filed by employees. 
We use Ln(#Litigation) to determine whether a greater number of employee allegations persuades 
firms to involve more in lobbying. For this reason, we hypothesize that; 
H.1: All other things equal, a greater number of employee litigations increases firm-level lobbying 
activity. (β1>0) 
• Lobbying Activity = β0+ β1 Ln(#Litigation) +∑ βs Controls (1) 
                                                          
24 Our data include 326 missing case outcomes, since some cases are still ongoing. We also failed to obtain 561 charging parties 
due to missing observations in the data. 
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We measure lobbying activity in several ways. First, we measure log transformation of the total 
number of bills sponsored by firms, which is defined as Ln(TotalBills). Second, we specifically 
calculate log transformation of the total number of labor-related bills, which is Ln(LaborLobby). 
We then divide labor-related bills by total number of all bills and calculate %LaborRatio. We 
generate log transformation of the total lobbying expenditure as Ln(LobbyExpense). We also create 
a binary variable Lobbydum, which is equal to one if firm has lobbying activity in given year, zero 
otherwise. We regress lobbying indicators on Ln(#Litigation) and other firm-specific control 
variables to understand whether a greater number of allegations increases the lobbying activity at 
firm level. Our set of control variables is as follows. We first use log transformation of the number 
of employees to proxy for firm size. Second, we use a set of firm characteristics as book leverage, 
ROA, tangibility, Tobin’s Q, Herfindahl index, log transformation of firm age, and free cash flow. 
The third set of control variables is defined as labor-related variables to reduce omitted variable 
issues such as % of industry unionization, high tech firm indicator, union membership growth at 
industry level, pension expenses, % of state-level unionization rate, personal intensity, and 
property, plants, and equipment. We estimate the model by running a fixed effect panel 
regression.25 
While our goal is to analyze the underlying reason of lobbying decisions in labor-related issues, 
we believe that corporate lobbying activities may benefit the firms by influencing the legal 
processes (Yu and Yu 2012). In such case, we hypothesize that lobbying firms may obtain different 
case outcomes compared to non-lobbying rivals based on the political capital they built over the 
time.  
H.2: All other things equal, lobbying influences the litigation outcome. (𝛽1>0)  
• Case Outcome = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1LobbyingIndicators +∑ 𝛽𝑠 Controls (2) 
Case outcome is calculated in two ways: a) the total number of dismissals in a given year and b) 
the total number of withdrawals in a given year. Dismissal outcome refers to the situation where 
the court rejects the case after the initial hearing. Withdrawal outcome is the case where the 
charging party (employee or union) does not further carry on their claims. We also divide total 
dismissals by overall total number of cases to obtain %Dismiss, as well as total withdrawal divided 
                                                          
25 Std. Errors are clustered at firm-level.  
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by total cases to calculate %Withdrawal as a percentage of the sample. To measure the effect of 
lobbying on case outcome, we introduce a set of lobbying indicators in our analysis. First, we 
employ log transformation of lobbying expenditure as Ln(LobbyExp). Second, we create 
Ln(#LaborLobby), which is the log transformation of the total number of labor-related bills. Third, 
we obtain Ln(#Law) as the log transformation of the total number of labor-related bills that became 
law. We generate Law binary variable, and it is equal to one if the firm has at least one labor bill 
that became law, zero otherwise. We also generate another binary variable as More Law, and it is 
equal to one if the firm has more bills that became law compared to bills that failed to become law. 
We use the same set of control variables to understand if the lobbying influences the enforcement 
outcome.  
We believe that lobbying may influence the case outcome for different reasons. First, lobbying 
firms may change practices in the work place, which would yield to more dismissals for future 
allegations and litigations. Second, political connections, contributions, and spending are defined 
as strategic action that aims at altering policy proposals on behalf of firms’ and/or industries’ 
interest that allows firms to be able to evade the violations, inspections, and investigations. And 
third, lobbying and other policy changes may increase the duration of the case where the charging 
parties (union and/or individual employee) may face difficulties to fund the costly litigations. In 
this case, we would observe more withdrawals by charging parties (union and/or individual 
employee) as a final case outcome. To understand whether lobbying influences the litigation 
process, we hypothesize; 
 H.3: All other things equal, lobbying increases the case duration. (𝛽1>0)  
• Days = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1LobbyingIndicators +∑ 𝛽𝑠 Controls (3) 
Since each case has a different duration, we run a cross-sectional analysis to analyze the 
relationship between lobbying and duration at case level. Our dependent variable Days is 
calculated as the log transformation of the number of days between Closing Date minus the 
Opening Date of the cases. We regress Days on lobbying indicators, including lobbying 
expenditure and number of sponsored bills, to determine whether lobbying influences case 
duration, which may ultimately affect the outcome.  
If lobbying in labor issues is motivated by employee-level litigations, we expect that the political 
engagement should provide some benefit for those firms that spend resources on establishing 
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political connections. In other words, lobbying may create firm value if the litigation has little or 
no effect on the firm performance of responsible firms. We measure the effect of lobbying on firm 
performance in two different ways. First, we conduct an event study of successful lobbying 
process. We collect as many days where labor-related bills became law and/or passed in the US 
House and Senate to measure the market reaction. 
H.4: All other things equal, lobbying positively affects the firm performance in terms of changing 
in Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR).  
To measure the market reaction of bill becoming law, we employ the event study CAPM method: 
Where Ri,t is the actual return over day t, rf,t is a risk-free return, and RM,t is the return of a selected 
market index (we use Value Weight index from CRSP). 
Ri,t − rf,t = ∝i+ βi,M(RM,t − rf,t) + ϵi,t (4) 
We use different event windows around announcement dates, CAR[-t, +t], where we introduce the 
null hypothesis that cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero: 
 Ho: CAR = 0 (5) 
In addition to market reaction, we follow Gande and Lewis (2009) and convert the daily abnormal 
returns into an estimate of the economic dollar effect for each event in our sample. We calculate 
that the dollar effect for firm j at date t is computed as 
DEjt = Pjt−1 x ARjt (6) 
where Pjt−1 is the market capitalization of firm and ARjt is the daily abnormal return computed as 
the actual return minus the market benchmark return (Value Weight index from CRSP). We then 
calculate cumulative daily economic dollar effects over the event window. For example, 
cumulative economic effect 𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑗 for firm j and bill i over event window [𝜏1𝜏2] is computed as: 
𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑗[𝜏1𝜏2] =  ∑ 𝐷𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝑡𝑖+𝜏2
𝑠=𝑡𝑖+𝜏1
 (7) 
Our second analysis is to show that successful lobbying activity protects firms from litigation 
effects. In this case, we use Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable and test the effect of litigation for 
our sample firms.  
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H.5: All other things equal, lobbying affects firm performance. (𝛽1>0)  
• Firm Performance = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1Litigation +∑ 𝛽𝑠 Controls (8) 
Firm performance is measured by Tobin’s Q, and it is regressed on litigation, which is defined as 
Ln(#Litigation). In brief, we examine if the political engagement in lobbying would protect firms 
from lawsuit outcomes that may hurt the shareholder wealth. We split our sample between lobbyist 
and non-lobbyist firms and test the effect of litigation on Tobin’s Q. Then, we compare coefficients 
from two separate regressions to show not only visually but also statistically that there exists a 
difference between samples. We first use all our samples to identify the effect of litigation on firm 
performance. We then create a matched sample between our firms and document the benefit of 
lobbying.  
4.2) Robustness Check 
 
For robustness check, we perform different approaches to confirm that our results hold when we 
change the sample or the explanatory variables. First, we perform propensity score matching to 
compare lawsuit characteristics at firm level. We match our firms based on the number of 
employees, book-to-market, year, and industry. We split our sample into two groups: the 
Treatment group, which includes lobbying firms, and the Control group, which includes non-
lobbying firms. In our propensity score matching, we use a) total dismissals, b) total withdrawals, 
c) cumulative dismissals, and d) cumulative withdrawals over a sample period span. 
Second, in addition to lawsuits, we also gather unique hand-collected labor enforcement datasets 
from the US Department of Labor. We obtain Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
Enforcement data, Wage and Hour Compliance Action data, and Employee Benefits and Security 
Enforcement data to identify the inspections, penalties, and violations at firm level. We also hand 
collect discrimination lawsuits filed by employees from Bloomberg’s BNA Employment 
Discrimination Verdicts and Settlements database. To eliminate unobserved or omitted variable 
bias, we assume that labor-related bills may be driven by not only lawsuits but also other types of 
employee allegations and violations. Our results quantitatively remain the same when we introduce 
additional work-related disputes. 
Third, our study includes different types of political connections rather than lobbying spending. 
While lobbying may be the most effective way to change policy proposals, firms may choose other 
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strategies to be politically connected. In other words, we examine whether our results remain same 
if other political actions are implemented by the firms. We gather unique hand-collected CEO-
level political contribution data to identify donor CEOs. Similarly, we also hand collect firm-level 
Political Action Committee (PAC) data to determine politically connected firms. In addition to 
that, we employ detailed lobbying data to identify the number of lobbyists employed by firms, as 
well as lobbyists who were former members of the US Congress.  
Fourth, we measure litigation impact on firm value by dividing our data into two samples. In the 
first step, we examine how litigation influences firm value for the whole sample. In the second 
step, we perform matched sample methodology by assigning each lobbying firm to a non-lobbying 
firm based on the number of employees, book-to-market, year, and industry. In addition to 
regression outcomes, we test the litigation coefficient from two separate regressions to show not 
only visually but also statistically the significant difference between two samples.  
Fifth, we perform a difference-in-difference approach to determine the effect of lobbying 
following the sponsored labor-related bills becoming law. Since we hypothesize that lobbying 
influences the case outcome, we estimate the following equation: 
Case Outcome = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1Treatment + 𝛽2PostYears + 𝛽1Treatment x Post Years +∑ 𝛽𝑠 Controls 
(𝛽1>0) (9) 
Case Outcome is defined as the total number of dismissals and the total number of withdrawals, 
respectively. We define Treatment group as lobbying firms and is equal to one, zero otherwise. 
Post Years is equal to one for years after labor-related bills become law, zero otherwise. Treatment 
x Post Years is the interaction term of two variables.  
And finally, to address whether there are other determinants (variables) that may drive the lobbying 
and litigation relationship, we control for firm-specific and employee-specific variables in our 
regressions. While Agrawal and Knoeber (2000) find that lobbying increases firm performance 
operating in heavily regulated industries, we assume that some industries also tend to be unionized 
to a greater degree. It is therefore essential to consider to what extent lobbying simply self-selects 
into traditionally unionized industries.26 We gather industry unionization data that contain private 
and public sector labor union memberships, coverage, and density estimates. We map union 
                                                          
26 Barry Hirsch (Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University) and David Macpherson (Department of 
Economics, Trinity University), created the Union Membership and Coverage Database, which is available at www.unionstats.com 
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coverage at the industry level to Fama and French industry classification by one-to-one at year 
level and control in our regressions. Furthermore, we create a binary variable for high tech firms,27 
which are employing high-skilled labor and may be more likely to face litigation—because of 
employee awareness—and lobby more—because of fast innovation and an active legislative 
agenda. We also control for growth at union membership at industry level, pension expenses, state 
unionization rate that is based on the headquarters of the firm located, personal intensity (total 
assets normalized by the number of employees), and property, plants, and equipment (normalized 
by the number of employees). In addition, we use perform firm-year fixed effects to eliminate 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. Overall, our results confirm earlier expectations where we 
document that labor-related allegations increase lobbying activity by targeting the judicial system, 
which may ultimately affect case outcome.  
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1) Lobbying Activity and Labor Relations 
 
Table 2 is designed to compare the sample means of two groups. Our main objective is to 
investigate the motivation behind lobbying decision; therefore, we first split our sample into two 
subgroups: firms with employee lawsuits and firms without employee lawsuits. In Panel A, we 
compare subgroups to understand the relation between firm-level political spending and litigation 
concepts. First, we find that firms with lawsuits have a greater amount of lobbying spending 
compared to non-lawsuit firms. In other words, employee litigation is associated with 
systematically higher levels of lobbying expense. They also lobby more bills and sponsor more 
issues in specifically labor-related subjects. Proportionally, we have more firms that are lobbying 
and are sued by employees compared to non-lobbyist firms. We then compare our firms based on 
additional political spending. We find that firms with employee lawsuits perform to higher 
Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions. In the same manner, CEOs from lawsuit firms 
personally donate more money to political parties compared to non-lawsuit rivals. In addition to 
political spending, we document that firms with employee lawsuits hire more lobbyists and employ 
more lobbyists who were former members of the US Congress.  
                                                          
27 The industries (by three-digit SIC code) are 283, 357, 366, 367, 382, 384, and 737. 
 
 
Table 2 
Univariate Analysis 
     
Variable 
Lawsuit   
[1] 
Non-Lawsuit  
[2] 
Difference 
[1]-[2] 
T-statistics 
 N=4,190 N=23,706   
A. Lobbying Characteristics  
    
Total Lobbying Expenditure 968,683.400 180,203.700 788,479.700 [32.68]*** 
%Lobby 0.280 0.110 0.170 [30.17]*** 
%LaborLobby 0.090 0.020 0.070 [22.21]*** 
Num. of Bill Lobbied 4.890 1.340 3.550 [24.58]*** 
Num. of Labor Introduced Bill 0.190 0.060 0.130 [13.51]*** 
Num. of Lobbyist Employed 30.960 8.520 22.440 [37.73]*** 
Num. of Lobbyist Employed: Congress 0.930 0.238 0.692 [26.41]*** 
Annual PAC Contribution 68,496.100 12,267.810 56,228.290 [14.18]*** 
Annual CEO Contribution 3,522.587 2,547.912 974.675 [3.99]*** 
Total Labor Bill Become Law 0.070 0.010 0.060 [17.22]*** 
Labor Bill: Labor Market Development 0.006 0.002 0.004 [4.05]*** 
Labor Bill: Worker Safety 0.012 0.004 0.008 [4.49]*** 
Labor Bill: Employment Training 0.037 0.009 0.028 [11.46]*** 
Labor Bill: Employee Benefit 0.082 0.031 0.051 [7.78]*** 
Labor Bill: Labor Unions 0.042 0.007 0.035 [11.53]*** 
Labor Bill: Fair Labor Standards 0.010 0.003 0.007 [5.10]*** 
Labor Bill: Benefits and Other Issues 0.002 0.001 0.001 [2.20]** 
     
B. Firm Characteristics      
     
Ln(#Employee) 
3.036 1.205 1.83 [65.66]*** 
Book Leverage 0.297 0.232 0.06 [3.97]*** 
ROA 0.037 0.023 0.01 [1.67] 
Tangiblity 0.339 0.227 0.11 [28.72]*** 
Tobin's Q 1.653 1.907 -0.25 [-8.22]*** 
Herfindahl Index 0.254 0.208 0.05 [14.67]*** 
Ln(#FirmAge) 
3.424 2.992 0.43 [37.44]*** 
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Free Cash Flow 0.042 0.025 0.02 [2.64]*** 
% Industry Unionization 9.117 6.090 3.03 [28.91]*** 
High Tech Firms 0.069 0.237 -0.17 [-24.80]*** 
Union Membership Growth 0.001 0.021 -0.02 [-0.90] 
Pension Expenses 0.597 0.046 0.55 [2.54]** 
% State Unionization 13.315 13.200 0.12 [1.10] 
Personal Intensity 8.766 29.506 -20.74 [-6.95]*** 
Property, Plants and Equipment 0.233 0.310 -0.08 [-2.29]** 
     
Propensity Score Matching 
Treatment   
(Lawsuit) 
[1] 
Control 
(Non-Lawsuit) 
[2] 
Difference 
[1]-[2] 
T-statistics 
C. Matched Sample 
    
Total Lobbying Expenditure 1,528,778.03 736,193.61 792,584.42 [9.30]*** 
Num. of Bill Lobbied 7.669 5.539 2.130 [4.56]*** 
Num. of Labor Introduced Bill 0.301 0.231 0.070 [2.62]*** 
Table 2 reports the univariate analysis between our sample firms. In column (1), we define lawsuit group if the firm is 
facing at least one labor related allegation. In column (2), non-lawsuit refers to firms with no labor litigation. In column 
(1)-(2), we report the differences in means of given variables and T-test results. In Panel A, we compare sample means 
based on lobbying activity. In Panel B, we compare firms by control variables used in this study. In Panel C, we generate 
match sample based on year, industry, size (#employee) and book-to-market and report the difference between 
treatment and control groups. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In next step, we investigate topics in labor-related bills and responsible issues. We find that firms 
that are facing employee lawsuits sponsor more bills in topics such as labor market development, 
worker safety, employment training, labor unions, fair labor standards, and benefits with other 
issues. Our results may indicate that employee litigation may prompt firms to lobby more in labor-
related issues. For robustness of our results, we also perform propensity score matching and report 
our results in Panel C. We match our firms based on the number of employees, book-to-market, 
industry, and year. We confirm our early findings where firms with employee disputes have greater 
involvement in lobbying activities.  
Overall, our univariate analyses report a more profound involvement in lobbying activity for firms 
that are facing litigation. While lobbyist firms are less likely to be caught for corporate fraud (Yu 
and Yu 2012) or lobbying may be driven from unethical practices (Borisov et al. 2015), we report 
that the firms that are frequently sued by their employment perform generous lobbying 
engagement.  
5.2) Association between lobbying and litigation risk 
 
In Table 3, we test our first hypothesis and estimate equation (1) to determine the relation between 
litigation and lobbying activity. We describe litigation as the log transformation of the total number 
of litigations in a given year and define it as Ln(#Litigation). Our dependent variables are lobbying 
indicators. In column (1) and (2), our dependent variable is Ln(#TotalBills), which is the log 
transformation of all the bills sponsored by the firms. In column (3), our dependent variable is log 
transformation of labor-related bills defined as Ln(#LaborLobby). In column (4), we employ 
%LaborRatio as a dependent variable, which is the total number of labor-related bills divided by 
all the bills sponsored by firms. In column (5) and (6), we use log transformation of total lobbying 
expenditure—Ln(LobbyExpense)—as a dependent variable. And in column (7), our dependent 
variable is Lobbydum and equal to one if firm has lobbying activity, zero otherwise. We perform 
industry-and-year fixed effects, as well as firm-and-year fixed effects to eliminate unobserved firm 
heterogeneity.  
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Table 3  
Litigation and Lobbying Activity   
     
Dependent Variable Ln(TotalBill)t+1 Ln(LaborLobby)t+1 %LaborRatio Ln(LobbyExpense)t+1 Lobbydum 
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ln(#Litigation) 0.166 0.033 0.030 0.004 0.912 0.208 0.302 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Ln(#Employee) 0.190 0.051 0.029 0.004 1.103 0.426 0.776 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Book Leverage -0.057 0.002 -0.013 -0.002 -0.272 0.045 -0.064 
 
[0.001]*** [0.823] [0.001]*** [0.012]** [0.001]*** [0.462] [0.492] 
ROA 0.019 0.016 0.005 0.000 0.103 -0.001 0.813 
 
[0.496] [0.544] [0.418] [0.804] [0.526] [0.997] [0.001]*** 
Tangiblity -0.112 0.351 -0.015 0.001 -0.403 1.425 0.209 
 
[0.139] [0.001]*** [0.275] [0.687] [0.370] [0.001]*** [0.542] 
Tobin's Q 0.022 -0.004 0.003 0.000 0.131 -0.021 0.103 
 
[0.001]*** [0.275] [0.001]*** [0.142] [0.001]*** [0.357] [0.001]*** 
Herfindahl Index 0.076 -0.410 0.011 0.004 0.518 -2.125 0.253 
 
[0.313] [0.001]*** [0.464] [0.135] [0.211] [0.001]*** [0.350] 
Ln(#FirmAge) 0.047 -0.535 0.005 0.001 0.279 -2.495 0.178 
 
[0.025]** [0.001]*** [0.307] [0.169] [0.024]** [0.001]*** [0.055]* 
Free Cash Flow -0.200 0.035 -0.048 -0.007 -0.906 0.353 -0.720 
 
[0.001]*** [0.420] [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.170] [0.148] 
% Industry Unionization -0.008 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.012 0.035 0.015 
 
[0.156] [0.708] [0.182] [0.641] [0.687] [0.061]* [0.590] 
High Tech Firms 0.175 0.155 0.024 0.001 0.659 1.190 0.446 
 
[0.001]*** [0.375] [0.001]*** [0.805] [0.066]* [0.250] [0.107] 
Union Membership Growth 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.016 -0.023 -0.002 
 
[0.035]** [0.925] [0.392] [0.560] [0.436] [0.292] [0.898] 
Pension Expenses -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 
 
[0.001]*** [0.773] [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.264] [0.471] [0.376] 
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% State Unionization 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.006 -0.010 0.001 
 
[0.520] [0.730] [0.914] [0.568] [0.657] [0.703] [0.925] 
Personal Intensity 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 [0.094]* [0.015]** [0.396] [0.244] [0.078]* [0.001]*** [0.230] 
Property, Plants and Equipment 0.020 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.116 0.062 0.065 
 [0.022]** [0.015]** [0.036]** [0.109] [0.029]** [0.016]** [0.001]*** 
Constant -0.589 1.343 -0.075 -0.009 -3.640 5.945 -7.233 
  [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.174] [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Year/Industry Fixed  YES NO YES YES YES NO YES 
Year/Firm Fixed  NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
N 22,187 22,187 22,187 22,187 22,187 22,187 22,187 
R2 25% 15% 9% 3% 24% 13% 28% 
Table 3 reports the multivariate regression results between litigation and lobbying. In column (1) and (2), our dependent variable is log transformation of total 
number of sponsored bill. In column (1), we perform OLS with year and industry fixed effects. In column (2), we perform OLS with year and firm fixed effects. 
In column (3), our dependent variable is log transformation of total number of labor related bills. In column (4), dependent variable %LaborRatio refers to total 
labor related bills divided by all the bills sponsored by firms. In column (5) and (6), our dependent variable is log transformation of total lobbying expenditure. In 
column (5), we perform OLS with year and industry fixed effects. In column (6), we perform OLS with year and firm fixed effects. In column (7), our dependent 
variable is lobbydum and equal to one if firm lobbied at least one bill about labor issues, zero otherwise. Std. errors are clustered at firm level. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our results are presented in Table 3. We find a positive relationship between the total number of 
litigations and the lobbying activity. Simply put, we find that a greater number of litigations yields 
to higher lobbying involvement at firm level. In column (1) and (2), we document that, all other 
things constant, increase in the number of employee litigations increases the number of bills 
sponsored in our sample. Similarly, in column (3), we find that employee disputes increase the 
number of “labor-related” bills. In column (4), we show that a higher number of litigation increases 
the labor-related bills as a portion of all bills sponsored by firms. In column (5) and (6), we find a 
positive relationship between the number of litigations and lobbying expenses. And finally in 
column (7), we find that litigation increases the likelihood of being a lobbying firm. Taken 
together, our results illustrate that employee litigations may drive firms into lobbying activities. 
Our findings are interesting given the fact that firms may feel threatened by the large number of 
litigations each year, therefore taking measures to adopt new laws by sponsoring labor-related 
bills. Findings from Table 3 are consistent with both our research motivation and our univariate 
analysis where we report a positive relationship between employee lawsuits and lobbying 
engagement for our sample firms. We document that litigations may be the driver of lobbying 
efforts for the firms that are seeking favorable treatment when things get bad.  
5.3) Association between lobbying, litigation outcome, and firm performance 
 
For further investigation of lobbying and litigation, we analyze how lobbying protects the 
shareholder wealth. In the first step, we obtain the days where the sponsored bills are introduced 
and/or become law and/or are passed in the House and Senate. The Congressional Bills database 
allows us to collect as many days as available in the data. While one bill can include several topics 
in it, we keep all the bills that include labor and employment topics. Since the main goal of our 
study is to focus on labor and lobbying relations, we drop bills coded in other issues if they do not 
include any labor topic in it.28 
To identify the market reaction for the lobbyist firms, we conduct an event study and measure the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for bills that are introduced. We test the market reaction as  
                                                          
28 Such as defense, tax, medical, transportation, etc.  
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Table 4 
Event Study: Bill Passed & Become Law 
     
Panel A. #N Lobbyist Firm T-Stat Prob 
[0,1] 1,627 0.87% 11.61 [0.001]*** 
[-1,1] 1,627 0.85% 9.27 [0.001]*** 
[0,2] 1,627 0.76% 8.33 [0.001]*** 
[-2,2] 1,627 0.62% 5.25 [0.001]*** 
[0,3] 1,627 0.76% 7.22 [0.001]*** 
[-3,3] 1,627 0.69% 4.92 [0.001]*** 
[-4,4] 1,627 0.90% 5.69 [0.001]*** 
     
Panel B. #N 
∆ in Market Value 
($mil) T-Stat Prob 
-10 1,627 -40.12 -1.97 [0.975] 
-9 1,627 -50.84 -1.80 [0.964] 
-8 1,627 -39.88 -1.06 [0.855] 
-7 1,627 -31.99 -0.80 [0.788] 
-6 1,627 -26.60 -0.52 [0.700] 
-5 1,627 -32.20 -0.57 [0.715] 
-4 1,627 -38.68 -0.61 [0.728] 
-3 1,627 0.07 0.00 [0.499] 
-2 1,627 -6.41 -0.09 [0.534] 
-1 1,627 -4.78 -0.06 [0.525] 
0 1,627 128.96 1.80 [0.036]** 
+1 1,627 122.05 1.71 [0.043]** 
+2 1,627 166.42 2.14 [0.016]** 
+3 1,627 168.24 2.11 [0.017]** 
+4 1,627 170.59 2.08 [0.019]** 
+5 1,627 148.32 1.77 [0.038]** 
+6 1,627 143.50 1.65 [0.050]** 
+7 1,627 158.69 1.76 [0.039]** 
+8 1,627 160.02 1.75 [0.040]** 
+9 1,627 171.78 1.83 [0.033]** 
+10 1,627 172.67 1.75 [0.039]** 
Table 4 represents the event study results from sponsored labor bills introduced and passed in U.S. legislative bodies. 
In Panel A, we conduct the event study CAPM method where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the actual return, 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 is a risk free return, and 
𝑅𝑀,𝑡 is the return of a selected market index (Value Weight index from CRSP). 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = ∝𝑖+ 𝛽𝑖,𝑀(𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
Days refer to the announcement days surrounding the bills becoming law. #N refers to the number bills 
(announcement) sponsored by firms. Lobbying Firm column is defined as cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
obtained by lobbying firms. In Panel B, we report changes in market value over selected event window. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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𝐻𝑜: 𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 0. We define event period -60 days before the event, and estimation period of -20 
before the event. We calculate different days of announcement once the bills are signed into law.  
Our findings are represented in Table 4. In our sample, based on data availability, we collect 1,627 
announcement dates where the bill passed in the House and the Senate and became law between 
2000 and 2014. In Panel A, we report a significant market reaction for lobbyist firms around 
several event windows such as [-1,+1], [0,+1], [0,+3], etc. In this case, we suggest that market 
participants may perceive lobbying as successful, since the lobbied bill by the firm finally became 
law. Our results from Panel A of Table 4 show that lobbying firms receive positive market reaction 
once the labor-related bill is introduced and passed in the US legislative bodies. We find that 
lobbying positively affects the firm performance in terms of changing in Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR). Following that, in Panel B of Table 4, we estimate the cumulative economic effects 
of lobbying activity. During the three-day announcement period [-1,+1], there is an average gain 
of $246.68 million in shareholder wealth. In the one-week period [0,+10] preceding the 
announcement date, lobbying provides additional gain to shareholder wealth measured as the 
changes in market value of the firm.  
Further, we analyze the relation between lobbying and lawsuit characteristics. We aim to 
understand the reason of lawsuits, the charging party, and the outcome of cases. While some 
scholars view firm political engagement as a strategic investment that benefits firms and industries 
(Goldman et al. 2009; Johnson and Mitton 2003; Boubakri et al. 2012; Hill et al. 2013; Faccio 
2006; Niessen and Ruenzi 2009; Cooper et al. 2010; Blau et al. 2013; Kroszner and Stratmann 
1998; Stratmann 1995; Chen et al. 2015), we study whether lobbying firms have different case 
characteristics and if so, how the lobbying influences the possible outcome of litigation for 
responsible firms. Table 5 is designed to compare lawsuit characteristics between two group of 
firms: a) firms with lobbying activity and b) firms without lobbying activity. Table 5 also shares 
information of the origin and outcome of employee lawsuits that are filed against corporations. 
Each lawsuit has a unique case number with section codes and the types of violations. We identify 
each case by determining the reason of the lawsuit, the charging party, and the outcome and then 
match with our firms from COMPUSTAT.  
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Table 5 
Univariate Analysis 
     
Panel A.  
Lobby   
[1] 
Non-Lobby  
[2] 
Difference 
[1]-[2] 
T-statistics 
 N=3,941 N=23,995   
Lawsuit Characteristics      
Coercive Actions 0.158 0.012 -0.012 [14.30]*** 
Coercive Statement 0.291 0.075 -0.075 [14.65]*** 
Bad Faith Bargaining 0.172 0.034 -0.034 [16.62]*** 
Changes in Working Condition 0.544 0.087 -0.087 [19.82]*** 
Discharge 0.470 0.120 -0.120 [15.45]*** 
Discipline 0.331 0.051 -0.051 [16.75]*** 
Refusal to Furnish Information 0.567 0.095 -0.095 [18.52]*** 
Changes in Working Contract 0.335 0.061 -0.061 [20.09]*** 
Onerous Assignment 0.019 0.007 -0.007 [5.14]*** 
Concerted Activities 0.224 0.047 -0.047 [16.93]*** 
Unilateral Changes 0.224 0.048 -0.048 [16.91]*** 
Fair Representation 0.054 0.019 -0.019 [6.85]*** 
Union Issues 0.048 0.016 -0.016 [8.98]*** 
Harrasment 0.021 0.008 -0.008 [5.15]*** 
Other Issues 0.409 0.141 -0.141 [10.43]*** 
     
Charging Party     
Union 1.570 0.465 1.105 [16.40]*** 
Individual 0.943 0.217 0.726 [16.03]*** 
 
    
Case Outcome     
Settlement 0.112 0.098 0.014 [1.03] 
Closure 0.007 0.003 0.004 [0.96] 
 
    
Dismissalt 0.679 0.187 0.492 [15.85]*** 
Dismissalt+1 0.656 0.198 0.458 [13.73]*** 
Dismissalt+2 0.652 0.202 0.450 [12.62]*** 
Dismissalt+3 0.633 0.208 0.425 [11.01]*** 
Cumulative Dismissal 7.877 1.073 6.804 [28.94]*** 
     
Withdrawalt 1.751 0.445 1.306 [18.88]*** 
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Withdrawalt+1 1.750 0.461 1.289 [17.48]*** 
Withdrawalt+2 1.772 0.472 1.300 [14.46]*** 
Withdrawalt+3 1.763 0.489 1.274 [14.87]*** 
Cumulative Withdrawal 18.161 2.408 15.753 [31.66]*** 
     
     
Panel B.  
More Law 
[1] 
More Fail 
[2] 
Difference 
[1]-[2] 
T-statistics 
 N=424 N=27,472   
     
Dismissalt 1.238 0.242 0.996 [11.26]*** 
Dismissalt+1 1.122 0.250 0.872 [9.16]*** 
Dismissalt+2 0.890 0.255 0.635 [6.48]*** 
Dismissalt+3 0.966 0.253 0.713 [7.11]*** 
Cumulative Dismissal 14.708 1.842 12.866 [19.06]*** 
     
Withdrawalt 3.294 0.59 2.704 [13.71]*** 
Withdrawalt+1 2.828 0.612 2.216 [10.51]*** 
Withdrawalt+2 2.454 0.624 1.830 [8.40]*** 
Withdrawalt+3 2.353 0.632 1.721 [7.71]*** 
Cumulative Withdrawal 33.821 4.189 29.632 [20.51]*** 
          
Table 5 reports the univariate analysis between our sample firms. In Panel A of column (1), lobby refers to the firms 
that sponsored at least one bill in labor issues. In column (2), non-lobby refers to the firms with no lobbying activity. 
We compare lobbying and non-lobbying firms in terms of case reasons, charging parties and case outcomes. In Panel 
B, more law refers to the firms that obtains more bills become law in labor issues compared to firms with no lobbying 
activity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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In Panel A, we examine the reasons of lawsuits. We find that lobbying firms are sued more in 
every topic compared to non-lobbying rivals and the difference is statistically significant. We note 
that lobbying firms are more likely to be sued for coercive actions, coercive statement, bad faith 
bargaining, changes in working condition, discharge, discipline, refusal to furnish information, 
changes in working contract, onerous assignment, concerted activities, unilateral changes, fair 
representations, union issues, harassment, and other issues. These results may help us to 
understand why lobbying firms with a greater number of lawsuits sponsor specifically labor-
related bills.  
In Panel B, we investigate the charging party on charge. We find that lobbying firms are sued more 
by labor unions. We also find that lobbying firms are sued more by individual employees, 
compared to non-lobbying firms, and the difference is statistically significant.  
In Panel C, we compare lobbyist and non-lobbyist firms in terms of litigation outcome. In our first 
set of tests, we find that a greater number of settlements is associated with lobbying firms 
compared to non-lobbyist peers; however, the result is statistically not significant. Our results may 
have two potential explanations. First, lobbying firms may not choose to settle, since they would 
realize the fact that sponsored bills may protect them in the future by changing policy proposals. 
Second, lobbying benefits the firms in terms of “settlement cost.” Since corporations spend 
millions of dollars as lobbying expenditure, they are not obligated to spend extra resources as 
settlement amounts, which would reduce financial burden and firms may avoid legal fees.  
In the second step, we focus on dismissed cases and withdrawn cases. Our findings state that more 
lawsuits are dismissed by court and more lawsuits are withdrawn by charging parties for lobbying 
firms compared to non-lobbying firms, and the result is statistically significant. We find that 
lobbying firms that face litigation obtain a greater number of dismissals and withdrawals for t, t+1, 
t+2, and t+3 years, respectively. We also find that lobbying firms have a greater number of 
cumulative dismissals and cumulative withdrawals overall in our sample period.  
For additional robustness check, we also split our sample into two groups: a) lobbying firms that 
have more bills become law in labor topics and b) lobbying firms that have more bills fail to 
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become law, or firms with no lobbying activity at all. We find that successful lobbying firms have 
larger dismissals and withdrawals if they have more bills become law in labor and employment 
topics.  
Our results from Table 5 have important implications. We believe that lobbied bills protect firms 
by altering the case outcome. In this case, lobbyist firms are better off where allegations are 
dropped against the defendant (corporations). This may be due to the fact that the charging party 
(individual or labor union) decides to drop off their claims, acknowledging the political protection 
that is gained by lobbyist firms. At this point, we can discuss the benefit of corporate lobbying, 
where changing policy proposals would give firms comparative advantage in legal issues. Thus, 
the univariate results of all four court cases are in favor of lobbyist firms, releasing the firm from 
subsequent legal costs. 
For further analysis, we carry our test to the multivariate analysis. We calculate the total number 
of dismissals and the total number of withdrawals for firms that are subjected to litigation. In Panel 
A of Table 6, our dependent variable from column (1) to (5) is the log transformation of the total 
number of dismissals obtained by the firms. In column (6), we divide the total number of dismissals 
by the total number of cases to find what percentage of dismissals are a part of overall outcome. 
We regress our dependent variable on lobbying indicators in the following ways: a) we use log 
transformation of lobbying expenditure, Ln(LobbyExp); b) we use log transformation of labor-
related bills, Ln(#LaborLobby); c) we use log transformation of the total number of bills that 
became law, Ln(#Law); d) we introduce the binary variable Law and equal to one if firm has at 
least one bill that became law in labor topics, zero otherwise; and e) Morelaw is a binary variable 
and equal to one if firms have more bills that became law in labor issues compared to lobbying 
firms that have a greater number of failed bills, zero otherwise. 
Our results shown in Panel A of Table 6. We document a positive relationship between lobbying 
and the number of case dismissals. Our results show that an increase in lobbying activities 
increases the total number of dismissed cases. In the same manner, we report that lobbying 
increases proportional dismissals as a percentage of all the cases. Our results document that the 
lobbying decision may not only be motivated by the number of litigations but also by the possibility 
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of influencing case outcomes. Our results are similar to Firth et al. (2011) and Lu et al. (2011), 
who document that politically connected firms are favored in the judicial process.  
 
 
Table 6 
Litigation and Lobbying Outcome 
Panel A. Dismissal   
Dependent Variable Ln(Dismissal)t+1 %(Dismissal) 
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(LobbyExp) 0.018 
    
0.002  
[0.017]** 
    
[0.001]*** 
Ln(#LaborLobby) 
 
0.101 
    
  
[0.032]** 
    
Ln(#Law) 
  
0.611 
   
   
[0.001]*** 
   
Law 
   
0.518 
  
    
[0.001]*** 
  
MoreLaw 
    
0.525 
 
 
    
[0.023]** 
 
Ln(#Employee) 0.231 0.231 0.243 0.245 0.242 0.018 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Book Leverage -0.020 -0.019 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 0.001 
 [0.642] [0.647] [0.630] [0.626] [0.631] [0.442] 
ROA -0.095 -0.094 -0.095 -0.096 -0.095 -0.004 
 [0.020]** [0.020]** [0.020]** [0.020]** [0.020]** [0.227] 
Tangiblity 0.401 0.405 0.404 0.401 0.403 0.027 
 [0.027]** [0.027]** [0.027]** [0.027]** [0.027]** [0.001]*** 
Tobin's Q 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.021 -0.001 
 [0.453] [0.451] [0.435] [0.434] [0.435] [0.772] 
Herfindahl Index 0.265 0.266 0.272 0.269 0.270 0.018 
 [0.238] [0.234] [0.228] [0.233] [0.230] [0.082] 
Ln(#FirmAge) 0.030 0.030 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.010 
 [0.390] [0.386] [0.345] [0.345] [0.352] [0.001]*** 
Free Cash Flow -0.070 -0.070 -0.073 -0.074 -0.073 -0.004 
 [0.226] [0.224] [0.218] [0.217] [0.219] [0.259] 
% Industry Unionization 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.001 
 [0.165] [0.158] [0.169] [0.172] [0.169] [0.512] 
High Tech Firms 0.092 0.086 0.095 0.097 0.094 0.003 
 [0.203] [0.221] [0.198] [0.192] [0.197] [0.622] 
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Union Membership Growth -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 0.000 
 [0.158] [0.147] [0.160] [0.162] [0.164] [0.794] 
Pension Expenses 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.001 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.420] 
% State Unionization 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 [0.756] [0.759] [0.739] [0.735] [0.735] [0.032]** 
Personal Intensity 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.275] [0.262] [0.227] [0.228] [0.226] [0.426] 
Property, Plants and Equipment 0.018 0.018 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.001 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Constant -0.695 -0.699 -0.727 -0.730 -0.724 -0.012 
  [0.070]** [0.069]** [0.061]** [0.060]** [0.061]** [0.510] 
Year/Industry Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 22,497 22,498 22,498 22,498 22,498 22,498 
R2 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 
Table 6 reports the multivariate regression results between lobbying and case outcome. In Panel A, from column (1) – (5), our dependent variable is log 
transformation of total dismissal obtained by firms at year t+1. In column (6), dependent variable %Dismiss refers to total dismissals divided by the total number 
of litigation. In Panel B, from column (1) – (5), our dependent variable is log transformation of total withdrawals obtained by firms at year t+1. In column (6), 
dependent variable %Withdrawal refers to total withdrawals divided by the total number of litigation. Std. errors are clustered at firm level. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Withdrawal   
Dependent Variable Ln(Withdrawal)t+1 %(Withdrawal) 
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(LobbyExp) 0.059 
    
0.004 
 
[0.001]*** 
    
[0.001]*** 
Ln(#LaborLobby) 
 
0.343 
    
  
[0.001]*** 
    
Ln(#Law) 
  
1.628 
   
   
[0.001]*** 
   
Law 
   
1.385 
  
    
[0.001]*** 
  
MoreLaw 
    
1.345 
 
 
    
[0.013]** 
 
Ln(#Employee) 0.506 0.504 0.551 0.557 0.551 0.037 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Book Leverage -0.060 -0.058 -0.063 -0.064 -0.063 0.004 
 
[0.472] [0.480] [0.451] [0.446] [0.450] [0.103] 
ROA -0.243 -0.240 -0.245 -0.247 -0.245 -0.008 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.136] 
Tangiblity 1.146 1.158 1.149 1.143 1.147 0.089 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Tobin's Q 0.041 0.041 0.045 0.045 0.045 -0.002 
 
[0.423] [0.424] [0.389] [0.387] [0.389] [0.080]* 
Herfindahl Index 0.540 0.545 0.568 0.559 0.562 0.025 
 
[0.235] [0.230] [0.215] [0.222] [0.218] [0.220] 
Ln(#FirmAge) 0.029 0.030 0.040 0.040 0.039 0.019 
 
[0.767] [0.762] [0.680] [0.680] [0.687] [0.001]*** 
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Free Cash Flow -0.131 -0.129 -0.142 -0.145 -0.142 -0.008 
 [0.276] [0.273] [0.262] [0.260] [0.262] [0.188] 
% Industry Unionization 0.099 0.101 0.098 0.097 0.098 0.003 
 [0.132] [0.125] [0.136] [0.138] [0.136] [0.136] 
High Tech Firms 0.087 0.065 0.101 0.107 0.100 -0.006 
 [0.647] [0.728] [0.607] [0.586] [0.607] [0.695] 
Union Membership Growth -0.037 -0.038 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.003 
 [0.208] [0.190] [0.216] [0.219] [0.221] [0.141] 
Pension Expenses 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.001 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
% State Unionization 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.002 
 [0.481] [0.485] [0.465] [0.461] [0.462] [0.001]*** 
Personal Intensity 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.236] [0.219] [0.175] [0.177] [0.175] [0.001]*** 
Property, Plants and Equipment 0.033 0.033 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.001 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.071]* 
Constant -1.696 -1.709 -1.823 -1.831 -1.818 -0.033 
  [0.086]* [0.085]* [0.071]* [0.070]* [0.071]* [0.318] 
Year/Industry Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 22,497 22,497 22,497 22,497 22,497 22,497 
R2 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For further investigation, we also test the relationship between the number of withdrawals and the 
lobbying effort. We realize that the majority of the cases in our study are withdrawn by the 
charging parties (unions or individuals). Therefore, we first investigate the impact of lobbying on 
withdrawals. Then, we try to explain why charging parties may be more likely to withdraw from 
cases.  
In Panel B of Table 6, our dependent variable from column (1) to (5) is the log transformation of 
the total number of withdrawals as a case outcome. In column (6), we divide total withdrawals by 
total cases to find what percentage of withdrawals are a part of the overall outcome. We present 
our results in Panel B. Our results are consistent with earlier expectations: we document that 
increases in lobbying indicators lead to increases in the number of withdrawals by charging parties.  
As reported in Table 6, we find that lobbying may influence case outcomes. These findings raise 
significant implications. Firms with lobbying activities may face different case outcomes 
compared to non-lobbying rivals (Lambert 2015). Therefore, we investigate alternative hypotheses 
that might otherwise explain the difference between firms that do generous lobbying spending and 
those that do not. To test the case characteristics and lobbying, we analyze the case duration. We 
believe that if the duration of the litigation is longer, the charging parties (unions or individuals) 
may find it costly to fund their allegations. This implies that if lobbying firms can delay resolution 
of the case long enough, they could potentially alter the case outcome. Our dataset allows us to 
calculate case duration by taking the difference between the decision date minus the opening date 
measured in number of “Days.”  
In Table 7, we use log transformation of the number of Days as a dependent variable. Since each 
case has a different duration, we run cross-sectional analysis and report our findings. We regress 
the number of days on lobbying indicators, including lobbying expenditures, lobbying status, and 
the total number of labor bills sponsored. Our aim is to identify whether lobbying has an impact 
on case duration, which may ultimately affect the outcome.  
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Table 7 
Lobbying and Duration: Cross Sectional Analysis 
    
Dependent Variable Days 
Sample (1) (2) (3) 
Ln(LobbyExp) 
0.028    
[0.001]***   
Ln(#LaborLobby) 
 0.133   
 [0.001]***  
Lobbydum 
  0.388  
  [0.001]*** 
Ln(#Employee) 
0.594 0.598 0.598 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Book Leverage 
0.054 0.056 0.053 
 [0.228] [0.215] [0.237] 
ROA -0.231 -0.230 -0.231 
 [0.083]** [0.083]** [0.083]** 
Tangiblity 
0.965 0.976 0.960 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Tobin's Q 
-0.024 -0.025 -0.023 
 [0.323] [0.300] [0.338] 
Herfindahl Index 
0.169 0.176 0.178 
 [0.539] [0.521] [0.516] 
Ln(#FirmAge) 
0.083 0.085 0.082 
 [0.319] [0.300] [0.319] 
Free Cash Flow -0.087 -0.088 -0.089 
 [0.483] [0.477] [0.476] 
% Industry Unionization 
0.016 0.018 0.014 
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 [0.298] [0.239] [0.332] 
High Tech Firms 
-0.122 -0.140 -0.123 
 [0.577] [0.536] [0.578] 
Union Membership Growth -0.012 -0.015 -0.013 
 [0.313] [0.197] [0.302] 
Pension Expenses 
0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
% State Unionization 
0.010 0.011 0.010 
 [0.130] [0.121] [0.124] 
Personal Intensity 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.120] [0.115] [0.117] 
Property, Plants and Equipment 0.021 0.021 0.021 
 [0.046]** [0.044]** [0.039]** 
Constant 0.503 0.467 0.502 
  [0.175] [0.204] [0.173] 
Year/Industry Fixed  
YES YES YES 
N 38,567 38,567 38,567 
R2 48% 48% 48% 
Table 7 reports the cross-sectional multivariate regression results between lobbying and case duration. Our dependent variable 
Days refer to the case duration between closing days minus opening day of the lawsuit. Std. errors are clustered at firm level 
(by GVKEY).*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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In Table 7, our results show a positive relationship between lobbying and case duration for 
responsible firms. We find that higher lobbying expenditure (Ln[LobbyExp]) leads to longer 
duration. Similarly, we also find a positive and significant coefficient for total number of labor-
related bills (Ln[#LaborLobby]), which indicates longer case duration given the increased number 
of bills. We also find that lobbying firms (Lobbydum) have longer duration compared to non-
lobbying rivals. Our results implicate that lobbying engagement at firm level may influence case 
duration, which may eventually force charging parties to withdraw from the cases.  
If lobbying firms can evade shorter case durations, we believe the charging parties may change 
their position over time. Using the data on case outcomes and duration, we employ survival 
analysis to examine whether lobbying firms have a higher probability of evading shorter case 
duration than firms that do not lobby. For our survival analysis, we run two separate regressions. 
In Table 8, we employ case duration (Days) as a dependent variable in column (1) and (2) and use 
two main explanatory variables: a) log transformation of lobbying expenditure and b) union binary 
variable equal to one if the case if opened by union, zero otherwise. Our first objective is to 
understand if lobbying may provide longer case duration for firms that may manipulate the case 
outcome. Our second objective is to understand if union-filed cases have longer duration compared 
to individually (employee) filed cases, which may eventually influence the plaintiffs’ claims 
against the parent firm.  
Our results are presented in Table 8. We report the cox survival analysis based on case duration. 
In column (1), negative coefficient on lobbying expenditure indicates a significantly lower hazard 
rate where lobbying firms may evade shorter case duration. Specifically, lobbying firms have 
longer case duration, which suggests that they would terminate the cases slower. In column (2), 
we document a significant negative coefficient for union binary variable. We find that if the case 
is opened by a labor union, they have a longer case duration. We interpret these results as union-
filed cases will be decided in the court slower. In column (3) and (4), we only keep the cases that 
result in withdrawals. Our concern is to explain why we have more withdrawals in our sample 
compared to dismissed or settled cases. Results in column (3) and (4) confirm our earlier 
expectations where we find that lobbying firms have a significantly lower hazard rate, which refers 
to longer case duration as a final withdrawal outcome. In the same manner, union-filed cases also 
obtain longer case durations for withdrawals.  
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Table 8 
Lobbying and Case Duration: Survival Analysis 
  Cox Regression 
Dependent Variable Days Days to Withdrawal 
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(LobbyExp) 
-0.011  -0.002   
[0.032]**  [0.001]***  
Uniondum 
 -0.053  -0.049  
 [0.001]***  [0.001]*** 
Ln(#Employee) 
-0.035 -0.036 -0.042 -0.050 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Book Leverage 
-0.100 -0.109 -0.066 -0.064 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.219] [0.254] 
ROA -0.018 0.000 0.156 0.161 
 [0.822] [0.997] [0.127] [0.120] 
Tangiblity 
0.003 0.006 -0.043 -0.031 
 [0.949] [0.893] [0.436] [0.581] 
Tobin's Q 
-0.030 -0.033 -0.018 -0.021 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.148] [0.096]* 
Herfindahl Index 
0.341 0.356 0.351 0.368 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Ln(#FirmAge) 
0.028 0.035 0.016 0.023 
 [0.016]** [0.001]*** [0.270] [0.113] 
Free Cash Flow -0.109 -0.125 -0.324 -0.370 
 [0.452] [0.397] [0.067]* [0.041]** 
% Industry Unionization 
-0.015 -0.015 -0.021 -0.020 
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 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
High Tech Firms 
0.158 0.154 0.037 0.027 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.601] [0.714] 
Union Membership Growth 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 
 [0.061]* [0.070]* [0.137] [0.161] 
Pension Expenses 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.461] [0.609] [0.420] [0.483] 
% State Unionization 
-0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.548] [0.940] [0.365] [0.606] 
Personal Intensity -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Property, Plants and Equipment -0.069 -0.067 -0.083 -0.080 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.021]** [0.025]** 
Year/Industry Fixed  
YES YES  YES YES 
N 27,455 27,455 17,112 17,112 
Prob>χ2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Table 8 reports the hazard ratio for Cox regression from column (1) to (4) where our dependent variable is case duration 
(Closing date minus Opening date) measured by days. In column (1) and (2), we employ all sample for our tests. In 
column (3) and (4), we only keep the cases where the outcome is Withdrawal. Std. errors are clustered at firm level. *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The evidence between lobbying and case duration has meaningful suggestions. First, our results 
may help to understand whether lobbying lengthens the case duration (time-to-resolution), which 
may force charging parties to review or reconsider their claims. Given the nature of lawsuits, a 
legal action is likely to generate direct costs (i.e. attorney fees and court fees, settlements and/or 
judgments), which may create a cumulative financial burden over the time. Therefore, the plaintiff 
(employer or union) who lacks financial resources to fund the litigations may drop the case, which 
would yield a favorable outcome for lobbying firms. Second, we document that lobbying firms 
may realize the effectiveness of lobbying during legal actions. If political spending from lobbying 
firms help delay enforcement outcomes by increasing time-to-resolution, the longer case duration 
may provide a mechanism through which lobbying activities eventually affect the severity of 
penalties from litigations (Fulmer et al. 2017). 
Our results suggest that effective lobbying activity may skew the enforcement process in ways that 
benefit the firms. If the lobbying is effective to influence case characteristics, we believe that firms 
may increase or decrease their lobbying activities as a response to allegations. Therefore, change 
in litigation frequency may lead to changes in lobbying in labor-related topics. We run sets of 
analysis and document the firm-level response to employee litigations. In Table 9, we measure the 
relationship between lobbying and litigation occurrence. In column (1) and (2), our dependent 
variable is ΔLaborBills, which refers to change in the number of labor-related bills between year t 
and t-1. In column (3) and (4), our dependent variable is abs(%ΔLaborBills), which is the absolute 
value of changes in labor-related bills to capture the net flow (or volatility) of lobbying. We also 
calculate the Decline in Labor Bills, which is the change in labor-related bills between year t and 
t-1 where the positive values are replaced by zero.  
Our results are reported in Table 9. In column (1), we find that a greater number of employee 
litigations leads to positive changes in total number of labor-related bills. In column (2), we find a 
positive and significant relationship between changes in number of litigation and changes in labor-
related bills. In column (3), we document that litigation leads to positive changes in the absolute 
value of labor bills. To put it simply, litigations affect variation in year-over-year lobbying activity. 
In column (4), we report that volatility in the number of litigation leads to higher volatility in labor-
related bill flows. We may reasonably assume that if the number of lawsuits increases because 
firms are facing employee disputes, then this increase in lawsuits may lead to the net flows in  
 
 
Table 9 
Lobbying and Change in Litigation Frequency 
    
Dependent Variable ∆LaborBills ∆LaborBills abs(%∆ Labor Bills)t abs(%∆ Labor Bills)t 
Decline in Labor  
Billst 
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(#Litigation) 0.008  0.029    
[0.001]***  [0.001]***   
∆ # Litigation 
 0.017     
 [0.001]***    
abs (%∆ # Litigation) 
   0.021   
   [0.001]***  
Decline in Litigation     0.030  
    [0.001]*** 
            
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES 
Year/Industry Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES 
N 23,221 23,221 23,221 23,221 23,221 
R2 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Table 9 exhibits the relation between litigation and lobbying activity at firm level. In columns (1)-(2), our dependent variable is change in total labor related bills 
sponsored between year t and t-1 at the firm level. In column (3), the dependent variable is abs(%∆LaborBills), the absolute value change in total labor related 
bills sponsored between year t and t-1 at the firm level. In column (5), we employ the dependent variable % Decline in Labor Bills, which is the change in total 
labor related bills sponsored where positive values are replaced by zero. Std. Errors are clustered at the firm level. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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lobbying for responsible firms. Lastly, in column (5), we find a positive relationship between the 
decline in the number of lawsuits and decline in labor-related bills. Briefly, our results indicate 
that the changes in litigation frequency may drive the firm-level lobbying activity in labor issues. 
Consistent with the overall evidence, firms may adjust their lobbying activity based the frequency 
of allegations. While we believe that litigations may drive firm into lobbying activity, we gather 
additional unique hand-collected employee level disputes and violations for the robustness check. 
In Table 10, we test the relation between lobbying and employee rights violations to understand if 
more complaints motivate firms to sponsor labor-related issues. In Table 10, our dependent 
variable is log transformation of labor-related bills. To conserve space, we report results from the 
total number of bills. Our results quantitatively remain the same when we employ log 
transformation of lobbying expenditures. We regress the total number of labor-related bills on 
several employee complaints and examine whether an additional number of employee disputes 
persuade firms into lobbying decisions.  
In column (1), we find a positive relationship between occupational safety and health inspection 
investigations and the number of labor-related bills. For this reason, more investigation leads to 
more bills sponsored by firms. In column (2), we document that wage-related complaints increase 
the number of labor bills lobbied in the US legislative bodies. In column (3), we use the total 
amount of wage-related penalties (in US dollars) given to firms and report that a greater amount 
of penalties increases the number of sponsored bills. In column (4), we divide the number of health-
and-safety-related concerns by the total number of lawsuits filed by employee. We again find a 
positive relationship between complaint/lawsuit ratio and the number of labor-related bills. In 
column (5), we use the total number of employee benefits and salary violations data and document 
that more violations lead to more labor-related bills. Finally, in column (6), we document that 
discrimination lawsuits against the parent firms increase the lobbying activity in labor topics. Our 
results from Table 10 imply that additional disputes, complaints, discriminations, and violations 
may motivate firms to sponsor bills to protect themselves from further allegations or reduce the 
potential harm resulting from investigations. However, there are other ways for firms to be 
involved in political actions. Firms not only incur significant lobbying spending (Chen et al. 2015; 
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Table 10     
Other Disputes: Complaints, Violations, Penalties and Lobbying         
              
Dependent Variable Ln(LaborLobby)t+1 
Sample    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Inspection) 0.016      
 [0.012]**      
Ln(WageComplaint)  0.033     
  [0.001]***     
Ln(WagePenalty)   0.003    
 
  [0.021]**    
%(Complaint/Lawsuit)    0.012   
 
   [0.001]***   
Ln(Employee Benefit & Salary)     0.076  
     [0.041]**  
Ln(Discrimination)      0.089 
      [0.001]*** 
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year/Industry Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 22,187 22,187 22,187 22,187 22,187 22,187 
R2 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
Table 10 exhibits the relation between litigation and lobbying activity at firm level. In columns (1)-(6), our dependent variable is total number of labor related 
bills sponsored at firm level. Std. Errors are clustered at the firm level for robustness check. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Hill et al. 2013) but also make PAC contributions (Cooper et al. 2010) or hire former politicians 
on the corporate board (Goldman et al. 2009). In the next step of analysis, we examine whether 
firms with a greater number of employee litigations have additional political connections. We 
believe that firms may build political connections to receive advantageous decisions from 
government officials. To confirm that, we calculate different sets of political connection variables 
and report our findings in Table 11.  
In Table 11, we examine if firms with employee litigations are overall more politically connected. 
In the first column, our dependent variable is CEO-level personal donation. We employ unique 
hand-collected CEO donation data and regress on the total number of litigations. We find that a 
greater number of lawsuits leads to more CEO contributions in our sample. In the second column, 
we document that litigations also lead to a greater amount of firm-level Political Action Committee 
(PAC) contributions. In the third column, our dependent variable is the total number of lobbyists 
employed by firms. We show that litigations increase the number of employed lobbyists. In the 
last column, we find that litigations lead to a higher number of employed lobbyists who were 
former members of the US Congress. Since 1998, approximately 250 former Congress members 
have become lobbyists (Yu and Yu 2012). We believe that employing those lobbyists may sustain 
connection to politicians and provide better access to legislators in the case of litigations. 
Therefore, the motivation behind political spending may not be only receiving business benefits 
but also obtaining favorable government permissions.  
Our findings have two important conclusions. First, it is reasonable to assume that firms with 
lobbying activities also tend to have additional donations or contributions to extend their political 
connections. Second, we document that litigation may motivate firms not only to lobby but also 
drive them into additional political activities to gain full benefit from building political capital. 
Similar to Fulmer et al. (2017), who document that the political action committee (PAC) and chief 
executive officer (CEO) contributions influence the Security Exchange Commission enforcement 
outcomes, we also assume that any contribution to politicians in a strong position may put pressure 
on government agencies that impose enforcement actions.  
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Table 11   
Litigation and Political Connections       
          
Dependent Variable   
Sample Ln(CEO  
Contribution)t+1 
Ln(Total PAC 
Contribution)t+1 
Ln(#Total  
Lobbyist)t+1 
Ln(#Total Lobbyist: 
Former Congressman) t+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(#Litigation) 
0.014 1.066 0.407 0.116 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
     
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES 
Year/Industry Fixed  YES YES YES YES 
N 22,166 22,166 22,166 22,166 
R2 9% 9% 9% 9% 
Table 11 exhibits the relation between litigation and political connections at firm level. In column (1), our dependent variable is CEO level political 
contribution. In column (2), our dependent variable is firm level Political Action Committee donations. In column (3), our dependent variable is total number 
of lobbyist employed by firms. In column (4), our dependent variable is total number of lobbyist employed by firms who used to be the former member of 
the Congress. Std. Errors are clustered at the firm level. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Our study further examines if firms are able to influence the case outcome by directly lobbying 
the responsible government agencies. Lobbying to politicians sitting on responsible committees 
may be more effective since they occupy the position of power, as well as being familiar with 
Congress. Particularly, lobbying to specific agencies by putting pressure on regulatory committees 
may influence Congress, which may favor specific legislations that develop favorable policies to 
certain interest groups. CRP database allows us to identify the firms that lobby certain bureaucratic 
agencies. In the first step, we identify the firms that are lobbying the following agencies: a) the 
Department of Labor, b) Department of Justice, and c) National Labor Relations Board. Indeed, 
lobbying in such agencies can allegedly incentivize the regulators to implement favorable 
treatment when it comes to reinforce the regulations. Therefore, we examine the potential reasons 
of why and how firms choose to lobby those agencies. In the second step, we calculate the total 
number of lobbyists hired by firms that are linked those agencies described above. Our results are 
presented in Table 12.  
Panel A of Table 12 investigates the efficiency of the lobbying actions. In column (1) to (3), we 
calculate log transformation of the total number of labor-related bills lobbied at the Department of 
Labor, Department of Justice, and National Labor Relations Board, respectively. In Panel B from 
column (4) to (6), we calculate the number of lobbyists employed by firms who are linked to those 
given committees, respectively.  
Our results show that a greater number of employee litigations increases the number of labor-
related bills sponsored in specific bureaucratic agencies. Similarly, more employee litigations lead 
to a higher number of lobbyists who are linked to those agencies. Our findings may help us to 
understand how lawsuits may motivate firms to target specific agencies related to judicial and 
labor issues that may ultimately affect the case outcomes. We believe that former employees of 
federal agencies (such as the Department of Labor or Department of Justice) can often find good 
positions as lobbyists, exploiting the connections that they built while serving in public service. 
For example, a Department of Labor administrator may go on to lobby his former colleagues on 
labor-related issues.  
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Table 12  
Litigation, Lobbying Agency and Revolving Doors   
Panel A. Agency Agency 
Dependent Variable Ln(#Dept.Labor)t+1 Ln(#Dept.Justice)t+1 Ln(#NLRB)t+1 
Sample (1) (2) (3) 
Ln(#Litigation) 0.084 0.051 0.001 
  [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.022]** 
CONTROLS YES YES YES 
Year/Industry Fixed  YES YES YES 
N 22,187 22,187 22,187 
R2 15% 15% 15% 
    
     
Panel B. Lobbyist #Lobbyist 
Dependent Variable Ln(#Dept.Labor)t+1 Ln(#Dept.Justice)t+1 Ln(#NLRB)t+1 
Sample (1) (2) (3) 
Ln(#Litigation) 0.009 0.006 0.001 
  [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.010]** 
CONTROLS YES YES YES 
Year/Industry Fixed  YES YES YES 
N 22,187 22,187 22,187 
R2 3% 2% 1% 
Table 12 reports the relationship between litigation and lobbying agency for. From column (1) to column (3), we calculate total number of bills lobbied 
at responsible government agencies. In column (1), our dependent variable is Ln(#DeptLabor) which is the log transformation of number of bill lobbied 
at the U.S. Department of Labor. In column (2), our dependent variable is Ln(#DeptJustice) calculated as the total number of bill lobbied at the U.S. 
Department of Justice. In column (3), dependent variable is Ln(#NLRB) calculated as the total number of bill sponsored at the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB). In Panel B, from column (1) to (3), we calculate the number of lobbyist employed by firms which are linked to responsible government 
agencies. In column (1), our dependent variable is Ln(#LobbyistLabor) which is the log transformation of total number of lobbyist employed by firms 
linked to Department of Labor. In column (2), our dependent variable is Ln(#LobbyistJustice) defined as the log transformation of total number of lobbyist 
employed by firms which are linked to Department of Justice. In column (3), our dependent variable is Ln(#LobbyistNLRB) defined as log transformation 
of total number of lobbyist employed by firms which are linked to National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Std. errors are clustered at firm level (by 
GVKEY).*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
 
 
The act of public servants switching to careers as lobbyists (and back again) come from agencies 
(such as the Department of Labor, Department of Justice, etc.) defined as “the revolving door,” 
which usually have powerful and well-connected employees. Our findings indicate that firms may 
employ former lobbyists who are linked to specific agencies to cater certain interest groups. We 
suggest that lobbying through lobbyists linked to specific government agencies may increase the 
effectiveness of lobbying due to the superior “skill” of linked lobbyists. Therefore, in the long run, 
we expect that lobbying firms may alter policy proposals easily, which may protect the firm value.  
Prior literature documents the benefit of lobbying for shareholder wealth (Chen et al. 2015; Hill et 
al. 2013). In our study, we investigate the possible reasons of why firms sponsor bills in labor-
related issues. And then, we analyze the consequences of lobbying activity. We first find that 
lobbying firms obtain different case outcomes compared to non-lobbying rivals. This may be due 
to the fact that lobbying may influence case characteristics such as duration. However, the issue 
remaining unsolved is whether corporate lobbying does benefit firm performance. To understand 
the relationship between litigation and possible reduced firm value, we employ a series of tests to 
measure Tobin’s Q of firms in our sample. Our goal is straightforward: we aim to show that 
lobbying firms that alter case results and outcomes may possibly gain protection that would 
eliminate potential loss to shareholder wealth. To illustrate that, we split our sample into two 
groups of firms based on their lobbying status and measure the lawsuit effect on firm performance. 
Our hypothesis is whether litigations have an impact on firm performance reflected in Tobin’s Q.  
Table 13 is designed to show the relation between lawsuits and Tobin’s Q after the employee 
allegations. We divide our sample in two groups: lobbying firms and non-lobbying firms. In 
column (1) and (2), we compare whole sample firms based on their lobbying activity. In column 
(3) and (4), we perform matched sample analysis. If a firm sponsors at least one bill in labor-related 
topics, we consider it a lobbying firm. Then, we find a non-lobbying firm that has similar employee 
size, book-to-market, year, and industry. We regress Tobin’s Q on a number of litigations while 
controlling for other firm-level control variables. We also test the lawsuit coefficients from two 
different regressions to show that there is not only a visual but also a statistical difference between 
samples. 
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Table 13    
Litigation and Firm Performance           
  All Sample   Matched Sample 
Dependent Variable       Treatment Control 
Sample Tobin's Q t+1   Tobin's Q t+1 
 Lobby Non-Lobby   Lobby Non-Lobby 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Ln(#Litigation) 0.005 -0.040  0.071 -0.038 
 [0.746] [0.001]***  [0.126] [0.001]*** 
            
CONTROLS YES YES   YES YES 
Year/Industry Fixed  YES YES   YES YES 
 
     
All Sample: Ln(#Litigation)Lobby = Ln(#Litigation)Non-Lobby  chi2(1) =  4.52 Prob>chi2 =0.033 
 
     
Matched Sample: Ln(#Litigation)Lobby = Ln(#Litigation)Non-Lobby chi2(1) =  19.26 Prob>chi2 =0.001 
N 3,348 18,801  4,001 4,001 
R2 35% 44%   39% 38% 
Table 13 exhibits the relation between litigation firm performance. In column (1) and (2), our dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. We divide our sample based on 
lobbying activity of the firms in our sample. We report the difference of Litigation coefficient with chi2 statistics and significance. In column (3)-(4), our dependent 
variable is Tobin’s Q and we use matched sample methodology for our firms. We match our lobbying and non-lobbying firms based on size (#employee), book-
to-market, year and industry. We report the difference of Litigation coefficient with chi2 statistics and significance. Std. Errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Our findings are presented in Table 13. For all samples, we find that a lawsuit lowers the Tobin’s 
Q for non-lobbying firms, while it has no effect on firm performance for lobbying firms. We 
document that an increase in the number of employee disputes lowers the Tobin’s Q for firms with 
no lobbying activity. On the other hand, we report an insignificant coefficient on the number of 
lawsuits for lobbying firms. While our results represent a visual difference between two samples, 
we also test two coefficients from two regressions to document that there is also a statistical 
difference. Furthermore, in column (3) and (4), we examine the effect of lawsuits on the matched 
sample. Consistent with previous findings, we find that there is a negative relationship between 
lawsuits and Tobin’s Q for non-lobbying firms. However, litigation has no significant impact on 
Tobin’s Q for lobbying corporations. Our results imply impressive findings for lobbying firms. 
First, we find that lobbying firms have more dismissals and more withdrawals as a case outcome. 
Then, we find that litigation has no effect for the firm performance of lobbying firms, while non-
lobbying peers suffer from reduced firm value in terms of Tobin’s Q. As a final step of providing 
a portfolio of evidence for our research question, we employ a robustness check and introduce 
difference-in-difference (DiD) analysis to document the relation between lobbying and case 
characteristics. We introduce three sets of variables for DiD regression. Our Treatment variable is 
equal to one if firm lobbies at least one bill in labor-related issues, zero otherwise. The second 
variable, Post Years, is equal to one for all the years after the labor-related bill becomes law, zero 
otherwise. The last variable is Treatment x Post Years, which is the interaction term. We use the 
total number of withdrawals and the total number of dismissals as dependent variables and report 
our findings in Table 14. In Table 14, we report the difference-in-difference regression results. In 
the first column, our dependent variable is log transformation of total dismissals. We document a 
positive and significant interaction term, which represents more dismissals over the time for 
lobbying firms when the labor-related bills become law. In the second column, our dependent 
variable is log transformation of total withdrawals. Consistent with our expectations, we document 
a positive relationship between lobbying and the total number of withdrawals for responsible firms. 
While litigations could be dismissed or withdrawn regardless of the firms’ lobbying status, our 
tests document that lobbying firms receive a greater number of dismissals and a greater number of 
withdrawals by possibly altering policies and regulations at the work place.  
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Table 14 
Litigation and Lobbying Outcome: Difference-in-Difference Analysis 
   
Dependent Variable Ln(Dismissal) Ln(Withdrawal) 
Sample (1) (2) 
Treatment * Post Years 0.080 0.101 
 
[0.012]** [0.025]** 
Treatment 0.053 0.104 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Post Years 0.012 0.044 
 
[0.684] [0.297] 
CONTROLS YES YES 
Year/Industry Fixed  YES YES  
N 23,659 23,659 
R2 15% 15% 
Table 14 exhibits the difference-in-difference test to document the relationship between lobbing and case outcome. In column (1), 
our dependent variable is total number of dismissal obtained by firms. In column (2), our dependent variable is total number of 
withdrawals obtained by the firms in our sample. Treatment refers to the lobbying firms which sponsors at least one bill about labor 
issues. Post Years refers to years after labor bills become law. Treatment*Post Years is the interaction term of Treatment and Post 
Years variables. Std. Errors are clustered at the firm level. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this study, we investigate whether lobbying firms are favored in the judicial process. We provide 
the first large-sample documentation of the relation between employee disputes and firms' 
lobbying efforts. First, we find that firms with employee lawsuits are more likely to be lobbying, 
have larger lobbying expenditure, sponsor more bills in labor topics, and overall engage in other 
types of monetary political connections.  
We then examine whether there is a bias in favor of lobbying firms that are involved in a lawsuit. 
We analyze the case characteristics of the firms in our sample. We document that lobbying firms 
receive more dismissals by court and more withdrawals by charging parties compared to non-
lobbying peers. This finding may be due to the fact that lobbying yields to longer case duration. 
Therefore, the plaintiff (employee or union) who does not have financial power to fund the 
litigation may drop the case, which would result in a biased outcome in favor of lobbying firms. 
We also explore how firms build effective lobbying channels for regulatory favors. We believe 
that lobbying to politicians sitting on responsible committees may be more effective since they 
occupy the position of power and are able to cater to certain interest groups. Our findings show 
that a greater number of employee litigations increases the number of labor-related bills sponsored 
in the Department of Labor, Department of Justice, and National Labor Relations Board. 
Additionally, we also document that more employee litigation leads to hiring more lobbyists who 
are linked to those specific agencies. We show that lobbying through lobbyists linked to specific 
government agencies may increase the effectiveness of lobbying due to the superior “skill” of 
linked lobbyists. Finally, we investigate whether lobbying contributes to shareholder wealth. Firms 
may face economically meaningful losses once they are involved in allegations at court. Lawsuits 
may generate direct costs (fines, penalties, prohibitions on commercial practices, etc.) and indirect 
costs (reputation effects) upon the filing of a suit. We show that litigation has no effect on lobbying 
firms, while non-lobbying firms suffer from reduced Tobin’s Q. We document that litigations yield 
negative Tobin’s Q for non-lobbying firms, while firms backed by lobbying do not suffer from 
litigations. We find that lobbying firms may gain advantage against firms that are not politically 
connected during the allegation process. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Definition of Variables 
   
Variables  Definition Source 
   
Panel A. Political characteristic at CEO 
level  
 
   
Annual Donation  Amount of money donated by individual CEO each year  FEC 
   
CPID CEO Political Ideology FEC 
 
(Contributions to REP - Contributions to DEM) / Total contributions (Hutton et al. (2011))  
   
Donation to REP. Party Total contribution made to Republican Party by a CEO per year.  FEC 
   
Donation to DEM. Party Total contribution made to Democrat Party by a CEO per year.  FEC 
   
Repdum Binary variable and equal to one if cpid>0, else zero. Represents 
Republican 
managers. 
FEC 
   
Panel B. Control Variables  
  
   
Firm Size  Firm's quarter ending market value 
 of common equity [PRCC_C*CSHO]  
COMPUSTAT 
   
Ln(Firm Size) Log transformation of firm size COMPUSTAT 
   
                          106  
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Tobin's Q  Market value of assets divided by book value of assets  COMPUSTAT 
 
[(PRCC_F*CSHO + at - CEQ)/at)]  
 
   
Book Leverage  Debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by assets  COMPUSTAT 
 
[(dlc+dltt)/at]  
 
   
Free Cash Flow The firm’s free cash flows in year t divided by its assets in year t. Free 
cash 
COMPUSTAT 
 
flow is the operating cash flow less expenditures on interest, tax, and 
capex 
 
 
(oibdp – xint – txt – capx) 
 
   
Agency costs FCF times Poor growth; Poor growth is a dummy  
equals 1 if Tobin's Q is less than 1 and otherwise 0. 
COMPUSTAT 
   
ROA Earnings before interests and taxes divided by assets  COMPUSTAT 
 
[ib/at] 
 
   
Tangibility Ratio of fixed assets to book assets [ppent/at] COMPUSTAT 
   
Herfindahl Index  Industry concentration by summing the  
squared market shares of the firms in the industry.  
COMPUSTAT 
   
ER(VW) (t+1,t+2,t+3) Buy-and-hold abnormal returns over year t+1, t+2, and t+3, CRSP 
 
respectively. Each stock’s return is adjusted by subtracting the buy 
and- 
 
 
hold value weighted market return. 
 
   
ER(EW) (t+1,t+2,t+3) Buy-and-hold abnormal returns over year t+1, t+2, and t+3, CRSP 
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respectively. Each stock’s return is adjusted by subtracting the buy 
and- 
 
 
hold equally weighted market returns. 
 
   
STDEV Standard deviation of a firm's returns over year t+1, t+2, and t+3, CRSP 
 
respectively. 
 
   
Panel C. CEO and Board Characteristics 
  
   
Log(Firm Age) The natural log of the number of firm's age COMPUSTAT 
   
Log(CEO Compensation) The natural log of composition of the financial  
compensation and other non-financial awards received by CEOs.  
ExecuComp 
   
Log(CEO Compensation inc. options) Total Compensation (Salary + Bonus + Other Annual +  
Restricted Stock Grants + LTIP Payouts + All Other + Value of 
Options Exercised) 
ExecuComp 
   
Log(CEO Salary) The dollar value of the base salary earned  
by the named executive officer during the fiscal year 
ExecuComp 
   
Log(CEO Cash) CEO base salary + bonus earned by the named  
executive officer during the fiscal year  
ExecuComp 
   
CEO Ownership CEO’s ownership of stock shares (shrown_excl_opts)  
divided by firm shares outstanding (csho). 
ExecuComp 
   
Log(CEO Age) The natural log of CEO age. ExecuComp 
   
Log(BoardSize)  Total number of directors given a board. RiskMetrics 
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Busy Board Proportion of board members who holds more than 3 outside seats to 
the total board size. 
CRP 
   
Minority Binary variable and equal to one if CEO is non-white, zero otherwise RiskMetrics 
   
Country of Emp. Binary variable and equal to one if the last  
primary employment of the CEO is USA, zero otherwise 
RiskMetrics 
   
City 1  Binary variable and equal to one if the headquarter  
of the firm is located in population dense cities. 
USA Census 
Bureau 
   
Panel D. Determinants of Lobbying 
  
   
Total Bills  Total number of bills lobbied including all topics CRP 
   
Total Amount Total amount spent in lobbying activities in USD CRP 
   
Total Number of Issue Total number of issue lobbied including all topics CRP 
   
Log(Number of Bills) Log transformation of total bills lobbied in given calendar year CRP 
   
Log(Lob.Amount) Log transformation of lobbying expenditure in USD spent by firms CRP 
   
Lobbydum Binary variable and equal to one if firm lobbied at least one bill, zero 
otherwise 
CRP 
   
Number of Bills Lobbied at Senate Total number of bills lobbied at U.S. Senate CRP 
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Number of Bills Lobbied at House Total number of bills lobbied at U.S. House of Representatives CRP 
   
Number of Bills Passed at House Total number of bills passed at U.S. Senate CRP 
   
Number of Bills Passed at Senate Total number of bills passed at U.S. House of Representatives CRP 
   
Number of Bills Became Law Total number of bills become law CRP 
   
Number of Lobbyist Emp. Total number of lobbyist employed by firms CRP 
   
Number of Lobbyist Emp. as Congressman Total number of lobbyist employed who were used to be former 
Congressman 
CRP 
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Appendix B: Definition of Variables 
Variables  Definition Source 
   
Panel A. Lobbying Variables   
Ln(LobbyExpense) Log transformation of total Lobbying Expenditure CRP 
Ln(TotalBill) Log transformation of total Num. of Bill Lobbied CRP 
Ln(LaborLobby) Log transformation of total Num. of Labor Introduced Bill CRP 
%LaborRatio Number of labor related bill divided by total number of bill sponsored CRP 
Lobbydum Binary variable equal to one if firm has lobbying activity, zero otherwise. CRP 
Ln(#Dept.Labor) Number of bill sponsored at Department of Labor CRP 
Ln(#Dept.Justice) Number of bill sponsored at Department of Justice CRP 
Ln(#NLRB) Number of bill sponsored at National Labor Relations Board CRP 
Ln(#LobbyistLabor) Number of lobbyist employed by firms linked to Dept. of Labor CRP 
Ln(#Lobbyist.Justice) Number of lobbyist employed by firms linked to Dept. of Justice CRP 
Ln(#LobbyistNLRB) Number of lobbyist employed by firms linked to NLRB. CRP 
Ln(#Total Lobbyist) Number of total lobbyist employed by firms CRP 
Ln(#Total Lobbyist: Former Congressman) 
Number of total lobbyist employed by firms who were 
member of former Congress. 
CRP 
Ln(CEO Contribution) Total amount of CEO donation FEC 
Ln(Total PAC Contribution Total amount of Political Action Committee (PAC) contribution FEC 
Ln(#Law) Log transformation of number of labor related bill become law. congressionalbills.org 
Law 
Binary variable and equal to one if firm has at least one labor 
related bill become law, zero otherwise. 
congressionalbills.org 
MoreLaw 
Binary variable and equal to one if firm has more labor related bill  
become law compared to failed bills, zero otherwise. 
congressionalbills.org 
Panel B. Litigation Variables   
Ln(#Litigation) Total number of employee litigation. NLRB 
Union Binary variable equal to one if litigation is filed by labor union NLRB 
Individual Binaru variable equal to one if litigation is filed by individual employee NLRB 
Settlement Total number of settlement decision as case outcome. NLRB 
Closure Total number of closure as case outcome. NLRB 
Dismissal Total number of dismissal as case outcome. NLRB 
Withdrawal Total number of withdrawal as case outcome.  NLRB 
%(Dismissal) Total number of dismissal divided by total number of case. NLRB 
%(Withdrawal) Total number of withdrawal divided by total number of case. NLRB 
Days Case duration measured as closure date minus opening date. NLRB 
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Days to Withdrawal 
Case duration for withdrawn cases measured as closure date 
minus opening date. 
NLRB 
Panel C.  Other Employee Disputes   
Ln(Inspection) 
Log transformation of total number of Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration inspections.  
Dept. of Labor 
Ln(WageComplaint) 
Log transformation of total number of concluded Wage and 
Hour Division compliance actions 
Dept. of Labor 
Ln(WagePenalty) 
Log transformation of amount of civil penalty from Wage 
and Hour Division compliance actions 
Dept. of Labor 
%(Complaint/Lawsuit) 
Total number of employee litigation divided by number of 
wage related complaints 
Dept. of Labor & 
NLRB 
Ln(Employee Benefit & Salary) 
Log transformation of total number of employee benefit 
and salary violations 
resulted in penalty assessment. 
Dept. of Labor 
Ln(Discrimination) 
Log transformation of total number of discrimination 
cases filed against the firm 
Bloomberg BNA 
   
Panel D. Control Variables    
Ln(#Employee) Log transformation of number of employee.  COMPUSTAT 
Book Leverage Debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by assets  COMPUSTAT 
ROA Earnings before interests and taxes divided by assets  COMPUSTAT 
Tangiblity Ratio of fixed assets to book assets COMPUSTAT 
Tobin's Q Market value of assets divided by book value of assets  COMPUSTAT 
Herfindahl Index 
Industry concentration by summing the squared market shares 
of the firms in the industry.  
COMPUSTAT 
Ln(#FirmAge) The natural log of the number of firm's age COMPUSTAT 
Free Cash Flow The firm’s free cash flows in year t divided by its assets in year t. Free cash COMPUSTAT 
High Tech Firms 
Binary variable and equal to one if firm is located in the industries 
(by three-digit SIC code) are 283, 357, 366, 367, 382, 384, and 737. 
COMPUSTAT 
Pension Expenses 
Pension expense divided by the product of beginning share price 
and common shares outstanding. 
COMPUSTAT 
Personal Intensity Number of employee normalized by total asset. COMPUSTAT 
Property, Plants and Equipment 
Natural logarithm of net property, plant and equipment divided 
 by the number of employees. 
COMPUSTAT 
% Industry Unionization Percentage of union membership at industry level www.unionstats.com 
Union Membership Growth Union membership growth at industry level www.unionstats.com 
% State Unionization Percentage of union membership at firms headquarter state. www.unionstats.com 
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